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Tax Planning and Policy Drift
SLOAN G. SPECK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. administrative state often relies on private actors to imple-
ment public policy.1 Taxation provides an archetypical example. The
Internal Revenue Service describes the U.S. tax system as one of "vol-
untary compliance," in which taxpayers calculate, report, and pay
their own taxes and timely file their own tax returns.2 In doing so,
taxpayers and their advisors consult statutes, regulations, and other
guidance to determine their obligations under the Code and regula-
tions. Taxpayers face more than just a choice to "comply or defy";
they and their expert advisors also must interpret the law to determine
the scope and content of compliance.3 The government passes judg-
ment on these private legal interpretations only after the fact, in audit
or litigation, if at all.4 Tax scholarship generally has addressed ques-
tions of tax compliance within a comply-or-defy framework.5 Less at-
tention, however, has been given to the effects on tax law and policy
of the private legal interpretations that are intrinsic to a system predi-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks to Ari
Glogower, Kathryn Goldfarb, Stephanie Hoffer, Cathy Hwang, Bill Nelson, Erin Scharff,
David Weisbach, and Larry Zelenak for helpful comments. Special thanks to Deborah
Schenk and Joshua Blank for their comments on multiple prior versions of this Article.
1 For example, when government outsources functions to private parties by contract,
they often have significant discretion about implementation, with attendant policy effects.
See Jody Freeman, Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 545 (2000);
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1369 (2003);
Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389, 418 (2003).
2 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-20, 2007-1 C.B. 863.
3 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev.
2029, 2036-37 (2005) ("Missing from this view is a recognition that private actors, not just
agencies, play a regulating role.").
4 See Sidney I. Roberts, Viewpoint of the Tax Lawyer, 34 Tax L. Rev. 5, 6 (1978) ("[T]o
a considerable extent, the law that is legislated is simply not applied [by Treasury or
courts]."). The government never reviews many taxpayers' legal positions. See IRS Data
Book tbl.9a & b (2015), http://www.irs.gov./pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf (showing overall audit
rates of 0.8% for individuals and 1.3% for corporations). Although high-income individu-
als and large corporations face substantially higher audit rates, the complexity of these
filers' returns hinders the detection of errors or evasion. See id. (showing audit rates of
34.69% for individuals with income over $10 million and 64% for corporations with assets
over $20 billion).
5 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 Va.
L. Rev. 1781, 1783-85 (2000) (discussing voluntary compliance).
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cated on self-reporting.6 This Article explores the ways in which pri-
vate legal interpretations can influence the development of public
policy, impeding a return to the state of law prior to such interpreta-
tions-a process this Article defines as "planning drift."
The power of private legal interpretations is evident in the tax prac-
titioner adage that the IRS does not challenge transactions "if there is
a long-standing and generally accepted understanding of [their] ex-
pected tax treatment."'7 This informal norm is sometimes called the
"Wall Street Rule," since these types of transactions often involve se-
curities issued through New York investment banks.8 For example,
assume that Congress and Treasury prefer Policy A. Congress enacts
a statute designed to implement Policy A, but the statute is incom-
plete and ambiguous as it does not clearly specify legal outcomes for
all situations. Private experts advise their clients that the statute per-
mits transactions that are consistent with an alternative Policy B and
inconsistent with Policy A. Policy B might be a permutation of Policy
A, or Policy B could incorporate ideas unrelated to Policy A. These
transactions, and the legal interpretations that justify them, become
commonplace among private experts and known among their public
counterparts at Treasury.9 When Treasury finally issues regulations or
conducts audits, it may accept the legal interpretations that implement
Policy B to avoid upsetting markets or taxpayers' expectations, or be-
cause it finds private experts' legal arguments compelling.10 If Trea-
sury accepts Policy B either explicitly through rulemaking or implicitly
through selective enforcement, private experts' legal interpretations
result in a policy other than that preferred by the enacting Congress.
This example becomes more complicated if Congress and Treasury (or
internal factions of either) have divergent policy preferences, or if
congressional or administrative policy preferences change over time.
Underlying the U.S. tax system is a general acceptance that taxpay-
ers may structure their affairs to minimize taxes within the constraints
6 Much tax scholarship focuses on the negative aspects of private tax planning and advo-
cates legislative or administrative action, but does not consider whether private tax plan-
ning constrains Congress or Treasury. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The
Influence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in the United States: 1981-1997, 52 Tax L.
Rev. 119, 124-25 (1997).
7 See Emily A. Parker, Acting Chief Counsel, IRS, Speech to the TEI/LMSB Financial
Services Industry Conference (Sept. 22, 2003), at 1, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/tei-92203.pdf.
8 See Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 1629, 1654-55 (2009); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 Tex. L.
Rev. 227, 286-87 (2010).
9 See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860 (1999); see
also Subsection II.A.1.
10 For a real-world example that traces this pattern, see text accompanying notes 71-73.
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of the law." The Wall Street Rule provides one vehicle through which
private actors and their expert advisors influence public policy by
"creat[ing] law through their own practices.' 12 Although many IRS
officials publicly disavow the Wall Street Rule's legal relevance,13 the
rule's "widespread acceptance in the tax world" 14 affects how the IRS
approaches administration and enforcement.15 This Article formalizes
and elaborates the intuitions behind phenomena such as the Wall
Street rule-the mechanisms by which private legal interpretations
can alter the course of public policy-as well some implications of
these mechanisms for policymakers.
This Article introduces the concept of planning drift to describe pol-
icy changes that result from private legal interpretations, and proposes
a framework for analyzing how private legal interpretations influence
the development of public policy. Planning drift occurs when private
experts, such as lawyers, interpret law in the service of their clients, in
the context of actual or contemplated private activity, and under the
constraints of professional norms and ethics.16 This Article contrib-
utes to the literature on policy drift, which explores how public policy
enacted by a legislature can be vitiated by administrative rulemaking
and subsequent legislation. Bureaucratic drift occurs when agencies
11 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) ("The legal right of a taxpayer to de-
crease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by
means which the law permits, cannot be doubted."); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810
(2d Cir. 1934) ("Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possi-
ble; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury."). But see
David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 215, 220-22 (arguing
that, although the Gregory doctrine is "well-embedded" in current law, there is no princi-
pled reason why the doctrine must exist).
12 Bradley Bordon & David Reiss, Wall Street Rule Applied to REMIC Classification,
18 Westlaw J. Sec. Litig. & Reg. 1 (2012).
13 Id; see also Fleischer, note 8, at 286-87 ("Once deals are completed, the advantageous
tax treatment is rarely overturned, even in cases where the legal argument is weak.");
David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 Tax L. Rev. 331, 337 (2006) ("[B]y the time
[the IRS] does discover the technique, it will feel constrained not to challenge it, given the
heavy volume of transactions that already have taken advantage of it, and the political
clout behind those transactions.").
14 Parker, note 7, at 2.
15 See Heather C. Maloy, Where the Rubber Hits the Road: A View of the Tax System
from a Tax Administrator's Perspective, Woodworth Memorial Lecture (May 10, 2012), in
39 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2012):
[J]ust because the IRS has the legal right to challenge a transaction or make an
adjustment..., I believe a real question still exists related to when it is in the
best interest of sound tax administration for the Commissioner to challenge a
position taken by a taxpayer when the law is uncertain.
16 This insight is similar to the observation that private litigants shape the development
of case law, both by their choices of which claims to bring and the legal arguments they
make before the court. See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeep-
ers, 123 Yale L.J. 616 (2013). This Article expands this observation beyond the courtroom
and into transactional law.
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promulgate rules that diverge from the enacting legislature's policy
preferences,17 while legislative drift takes place when future legislative
coalitions amend or replace the enacting legislature's statutes.18 This
Article newly identifies planning drift as a type of policy drift that
occurs when private interpretations of existing law deviate from the
enacting legislature's policy preferences; by doing so, this Article ad-
vances the positive political theory literature by situating private ac-
tors and their expert advisors within the policymaking process.19
Planning drift also bridges scholarship on taxation and administrative
law. Tax scholarship generally acknowledges the role of private ex-
perts in creating legal interpretations but gives less attention to the
effects of these interpretations on policy development.20 By contrast,
administrative law scholarship explores the private sector's role in
shaping public policy but largely ignores everyday legal interpreta-
tions by private experts.2' As a concept, planning drift emphasizes the
17 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Pro-
cedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. Org. 243 (1987) [hereinafter Ad-
ministrative Procedures]; Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431 (1989) [hereinafter Structure and Process]. Bu-
reaucratic drift occurs not only through affirmative interpretations but also through agency
"shirking" (by delaying rules or issuing ineffectual rules), see Jacob E. Gersen & Anne
Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 923, 932-33
(2008), and agency inaction or nonenforcement, see Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers
and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 Geo. L.J.
671, 683-84 (1992); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 Va. L. Rev. 93, 110
(2005).
18 See Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative Ar-
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies": Administrative Process and Organiza-
tional Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 Va. L. Rev. 499 (1989). One
other type of policy drift, "epistemic drift," is not relevant to this Article. See Stuart Sha-
piro & David Guston, Procedural Control of Bureaucracy, Peer Review, and Epistemic
Drift, 17 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 535 (2007).
19 For this purpose, "policy" is the (abstract) objective of government action, and "law"
is one of the (concrete) instruments that manifest this objective. This Article refers to the
enacting legislature's policy preferences rather than to legislative intent in order to distin-
guish these abstract preferences from more lawyerly understandings of legislative intent as
used in statutory interpretation.
20 See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search
for a Silver Bullet, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1939, 1939-41 (2005); Noel B. Cunningham & James
R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 2-4 (2004); Weisbach, note 11,
at 215.
21 For formal mechanisms of privatization, see, e.g., Government by Contract: Out-
sourcing and American Democracy (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (contrac-
tual outsourcing); Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement, 17 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 637 (2013) (same); Shapiro, note 1 (same); Ste-
phenson, note 17 (private enforcement). For regimes where the state is absent, such as
private ordering, see, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. L. Rev. 319, 324
(2002); Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991).
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importance of private legal interpretations in the development of pub-
lic policy.22
In a general sense, planning drift can occur with respect to legisla-
tion, agency rulemaking, or even judicial decisions-any legal author-
ity that applies to private parties. This Article focuses on planning
drift between the enactment of a statute by the legislature and the first
government intervention post-enactment, through either agency
rulemaking or subsequent legislation. The drift literature generally
approaches policy change from the perspective of the enacting legisla-
ture, and this Article does as well, in order to juxtapose planning drift
with bureaucratic drift and legislative drift. In addition, the enacting
legislature has a significant stake in the magnitude and direction of
planning drift.2 3 In many cases, the legislature may find planning drift
problematic, and this Article offers several strategies that the enacting
legislature can use to manage planning drift where it is not wanted.
From the legislature's perspective, however, planning drift is not al-
ways undesirable. As this Article shows, the enacting legislature (or
particular members thereof) may tolerate or even welcome planning
See also Vandenbergh, note 3, at 2032-34 (discussing the "shadow law of second-order
agreements" in which private parties contract over regulatory imperatives and risk).
22 Planning drift also complicates the sociological literature on "legal endogeneity."
Lauren Edelman and others argue that organizations, such as businesses, construct internal
procedures to evidence compliance with legal regimes. These procedures "create ritualized
ideas about what constitutes a rational response to law," and these procedures function to
convince courts, legislatures, and agencies that the internal procedures themselves, rather
than substantive outcomes, suffice to demonstrate legal compliance. Lauren B. Edelman,
Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Griev-
ance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 Am. J. Soc. 405, 406-07 (1999). In this way, "orga-
nizations are involved in the social construction of legal meaning." Lauren B. Edelman &
Shauhin A. Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply-That Isn't the Question: How Organi-
zations Construct the Meaning of Compliance, in Explaining Compliance: Business Re-
sponses to Regulation 103, 114 (Christine Parker & Vlbeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011).
The literature on legal endogeneity focuses on the substitution of internal procedures for
external oversight (for example, private dispute resolution for consumer products claims
instead of judicial or administrative adjudication). Id. at 111-13. By contrast, planning
drift highlights how private legal interpretations affect the development of substantive law.
In addition, Edelman and others view managerial structure (of businesses, in particular) as
the mechanism through which government actors adopt private processes into the law. Id.
at 105. This Article looks to policy communities, comprised of experts, as the drivers of
planning drift. These policy communities span the public-private divide and function as a
network for the development and dissemination of ideas, rather than as a unidirectional
conduit to incorporate ideas of managerial efficiency into the law. The literature on legal
endogeneity treats ideas as instrumental, while planning drift takes ideas on their own
terms. Finally, Edelman casts legal endogeneity as a pernicious process by which private
interests co-opt the law. Id. at 108-10. As elaborated in this Article, planning drift may
have either harmful or beneficial effects, depending on context.
23 This Article sets aside the issue of whether the enacting legislature's policy prefer-
ences deserve independent normative weight.
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drift, depending on how planning drift interacts with other types of
policy drift and the enacting legislature's politics and purpose.
Most broadly, planning drift emphasizes the difficulty of drawing
hard lines between public and private, and between state and society.
This Article argues that private interpretations play an important role
in policy development-a role anticipated by the structure of the U.S.
administrative state, which in practice devolves significant authority to
actors outside the public sector.24 Private interpretations represent an
essential but often overlooked step in the implementation of public
policy, and mapping the potential effects of private interpretations has
implications for how the U.S. administrative state does and should
function. By emphasizing private actors' role in implementing public
policy, a focus on planning drift encourages a more nuanced view of
policy development and complicates cholarly conceptions of the U.S.
administrative state.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II defines planning drift and
describes factors that facilitate planning drift. Part III develops the
possible harms and benefits of this type of policy drift. Examples
from tax law illustrate these two Parts. Part IV explores techniques
that legislators could use to limit planning drift. Part V concludes. As
an appendix, this Article includes a detailed historical case study, fo-
cusing on the development of the rules governing corporate net oper-
ating losses (NOLs), that shows concretely how planning drift can
occur and how it affects public policy.
II. PLANNING DRIFT
This Part outlines the general features and mechanisms of planning
drift and then develops factors that facilitate planning drift with re-
spect to legislation. Although these factors are not dispositive by
themselves, they serve as indicators for when planning drift might
occur.
A. Mechanisms of Planning Drift
In order for planning drift to occur, private legal interpretations
must influence the development of public policy. From a purely for-
malistic perspective, the legislature, administrative agencies, and
courts can overrule private practitioners' legal interpretations at any
time and without deference. Under this view, government sets policy
24 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv. L.
Rev. 1285 (2003); Freeman, note 1; Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation:
Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke
L.J. 377 (2006).
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and writes laws that private practitioners simply implement, like a
transmission belt connecting an engine to an axle. In practice, how-
ever, the distinction between policymaking and implementation is less
clear.25 Just as administrative agencies may not faithfully implement
the legislature's preferred policy, private experts may interpret the law
in ways not anticipated by the legislature.26 In effect, lawmakers must
negotiate, explicitly or implicitly, with the private parties-and, in
many cases, their expert advisors as well-that they seek to regulate.
27
With respect to planning drift, this interdependency matters not nly
because lawmakers often take private interpretations into account
when writing statutes and regulations, but also because the contingen-
cies of the legislative and regulatory processes mean that the relevant
governmental actors may be unable to generate the political will to
intervene and correct private interpretations that fail to align with
those actors' policy preferences.
This Section develops the mechanisms of planning drift by first de-
tailing two general modes of legal interpretation-interstitial and re-
constructive-that private experts employ with respect to statutes and
regulations. One expert rendering a single interpretation, however,
25 See, e.g., Bamberger, note 24, at 392 (arguing that private parties play an active role
in implementing laws by helping to set regulatory standards). In administrative law, schol-
arship has moved away from a "transmission belt" theory of agency accountability, in
which agencies are viewed as mechanically and faithfully implementing legislation. See
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev.
1669, 1675-77 (1975) (arguing that broad delegations to agencies during the New Deal
drew the transmission belt model into question); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as
Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1758-67 (2007) (describing as
alternatives the "expertise," "interest group representation," and "presidential control"
models that superseded the transmission belt model).
26 In this sense, planning drift proceeds from an implicit principal-agent relationship be-
tween lawmakers and private experts. As an outgrowth of positive political theory, the
policy drift literature models policy change using a formal principal-agent relationship be-
tween the legislature and administrative agencies. Recent scholarship has added nuance to
the basic principal-agent model by, for example, exploring the effects of multiple legislative
principals, multiple administrative agents, and more complex political processes. See, e.g.,
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated
Power, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1443, 1444-46 (2003) (arguing that committees and committee
members act as potentially contradictory principals with respect to agencies); Terry M.
Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1, 25-26 (2006)
(noting that the political activities of organized bureaucrats, such as school teachers, com-
plicate simple understandings of the principal-agent relationship between the legislature
and agencies); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Un-
certainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1035,
1054 (2006) (arguing that the legislature may prefer to delegate to agencies rather than
courts if agency delegation reduces the variation in expected policy outcomes).
27 See Freeman, note 1, at 548-49, 633 ("[P]ublic and private actors negotiate over pol-
icy making, implementation, and enforcement."). This interdependency has prompted a
movement toward "responsive regulation," in which lawmakers take private relationships
and motivations into account when crafting statutes and regulations. See notes 261-63 and
accompanying text.
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rarely shifts the course of public policy. Expert interpretations carry
more weight within policy networks of private practitioners, regula-
tors, and other experts. These experts share information, debate
ideas, and develop norms that inform their legal interpretations and
policy preferences. Drawing on terminology from political science,
this Section describes these networks of public and private actors as
"policy communities," and these policy communities allow for the cir-
culation of ideas that can enable planning drift.
This Section then turns to two specific mechanisms that can result in
planning drift. The timing of planning drift gives private practitioners
a first-mover advantage with respect to subsequent regulation and leg-
islation, leaving administrative agencies and legislators to react and
respond to private experts' interpretations of the law. Where private
legal interpretations deviate from the enacting legislature's policy
preferences, there is de facto policy change. If the legislature or an
administrative agency cannot or does not summon the political will to
intervene, this policy change can be permanent. Furthermore, even if
the legislature or regulators act to correct private interpretations, the
coalitional nature of governmental decisionmaking means that these
interventions may not restore the enacting legislature's policy prefer-
ences. The content of subsequent legislation or regulation depends on
the then-existing policy landscape, including any private interpreta-
tions of the law.
1. Modes of Legal Interpretation
Planning drift begins with legal interpretations rendered by private
practitioners for their clients. These interpretations result from the
U.S. administrative state's reliance on private actors to implement
public policy, including the tax system's dependence on self-reporting
and voluntary compliance. These private practitioners' methods of
statutory and regulatory interpretation fall into two broad categories,
which this Article calls interstitial interpretation and reconstructive in-
terpretation.28 Statutes and regulations generally do not speak un-
equivocally to all factual situations, regardless of whether they are cast
as rules with ex ante content or as standards for which content is de-
termined ex post.2 9 Rules cannot anticipate all factual predicates,
28 Interstitial interpretation draws on H.L.A. Hart's use of "interstitial" to describe
judges' "law-creating powers." See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 272-73 (2d ed.
1994). Interstitial interpretation and reconstructive interpretation differ in degree rather
than in kind, and, in practice, some interpretations may not fall clearly into one category or
the other.
29 See id. at 272 ("[I]n any legal system there will always be legally unregulated cases.");
John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue 144-49 (2005) ("It is only in domains
that are complex, dynamic, and where litigants may find the economic stakes high enough
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while standards intentionally rely on interpretation for implementa-
tion.30 Interstitial interpretation fills these gaps in the law. Not only
do private experts interpolate meaning where rules are unclear, but
they also make judgments about whether a client's facts fall within or
outside of a given standard.31 Through their encounters with statutes
and regulations in their everyday practice, private practitioners elabo-
rate the law's content when they advise clients.
Private practitioners do not have unbridled discretion to make in-
terstitial interpretations. Instead, private practitioners' interpretive
prerogatives are constrained by the facts before them, the strictures of
existing law as understood by them, and the need to justify their inter-
pretations to others, including their clients and colleagues, as well as
governmental officials.32 For this reason, interstitial interpretations
may or may not advance client interests. Expert advisors sometimes
say no. Even if interstitial interpretations do not advance client inter-
ests, they may not be consistent with the legislature's policy prefer-
ences. Statutes are imperfect proxies for the underlying public policy,
and interstitial interpretations, produced in the ordinary course of pri-
vate practitioners' activities, can unlock the potential for planning
drift.
Reconstructive interpretations represent an affirmative use of the
law by private parties-a form of "creative legal engineering" or "cre-
ative compliance," in which practitioners deploy statutes and regula-
tions in novel ways to design structures that accomplish their clients'
goals while avoiding or taking advantage of legal regimes.33 Tax shel-
to invest in legal advice to see if there is a way around the law, that precise rules fail to
deliver consistency on their own."); Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosoph-
ical Examination of Rule-Based Decision Making in Law and Life 218-19 (Tony Honord &
Joseph Raz eds., 1991) ("[U]nder any plausible and non-question-begging conception of a
rule, there will be some cases plainly encompassed by the rule, some plainly not encom-
passed by the rule, and some whose coverage is doubtful."); Doreen McBarnet, When
Compliance Is Not the Solution But the Problem: From Changes in Law to Changes in
Attitude, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 229, 230 (Va-
lerie Braithwaite ed., 2003) ("[1]t is in the nature of law that it is open to different interpre-
tations, and that its meaning and application are arguable.").
30 See Weisbach, note 9, at 861-62.
31 See Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54
SMU L. Rev. 149, 150-52 (2001) (describing generational and lawyer-accountant differ-
ences in level of comfort with standards); Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of
Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. Rev. 131, 136-37 (2001) ("Good tax lawyers know when they are
pushing hard at the edge of the envelope."); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Sub-
stance in Taxation, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859, 883 (1982) (book review) ("The development of
an exquisite set of intuitions about what kinds of transactions the courts 'like' and 'don't
like' has become a large part of what tax lawyers sell.").
32 In this sense, private practitioners are like Hart's judges. See Hart, note 28, at 272-73.
33 Reconstructive interpretations generally are associated with formalism and rule-
bound methods of interpretation. See Doreen McBarnet, It's Not What You Do But the
Way You Do It: Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the Boundaries of Deviance, in Unrav-
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ters provide the most extreme examples of reconstructive interpreta-
tions, but not all reconstructive interpretations project such
impropriety. Practitioners, for example, have combined the partner-
ship tax rules with the rules for real estate investment trusts (REITs)
to develop widely accepted legal strategies that give property owners
both liquidity and tax deferral in transactions with a REIT.34 Com-
pared to interstitial interpretations, reconstructive interpretations give
practitioners more control over the facts they face, within the bounda-
ries of the underlying economics and the extent to which legally rele-
vant facts must reflect those economics.35 Unlike interstitial
interpretations, reconstructive interpretations result in client-
favorable positions, since clients only implement legal strategies that
are expected to provide net benefits, after taking into account devel-
opment costs, opportunity costs, and the costs of any unfavorable or
overcautious advice bundled into the larger plan.36
Reconstructive interpretations also increase lawmakers' costs in de-
signing new rules (and increase the complexity of those rules), since
lawmakers must police and anticipate interactions among rules when
drafting.37 As a result, many commentators view reconstructive inter-
pretation as intrinsically negative, although private practitioners may
see themselves as simply taking advantage of legal regimes that legis-
lators or regulators intended to create.38 Indeed, the line between
permissible and impermissible reconstructive interpretation often
emerges only after the interpretations have occurred, as courts decide
liminal cases. Before courts resolve these cases, private experts may
eling Criminal Justice: Eleven British Studies 257 (David Downes ed., 1992); McBarnet,
note 29; Sol Picciotto, Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regula-
tory State, 29 Law & Pol'y 11 (2007). A third category of interpretations, emphasized in
the literature on legal endogeneity, involves the development of private procedures that
serve to signal compliance with particular public policy. To the extent that government
actors explicitly or implicitly accept these private procedures as substitutes for correspond-
ing public processes, the private procedures become the law. See note 22; see also
Subsection.A.2.
34 See Michael K. Carnivale, James P. de Bree, Jr., Mark N. Schneider, Charles B.
Temkin & Fred T. Witt, Jr., Real Estate Investment Trusts, 742 Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA)
§§ V.A., VI. (2008) (discussing UPREITS and downREITs).
35 Any changes to these underlying facts, however, may represent frictions with respect
to the proposed business deal. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax
Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312, 1326-27 (2001).
36 See Braithwaite, note 29, at 147-49; Picciotto, note 33, at 14-19.
37 See Weisbach, note 9, at 870-71 (noting the "uncommon becoming common"
problem).
38 Compare, e.g., Weisbach, note 11, at 224-25 & n.22, with Michael L. Schler, Ten More
Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor
Weisbach, 55 Tax L. Rev. 325, 386-87 (2002).
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coalesce around general views of acceptable and unacceptable legal
interpretations.3
9
The dynamics of private interpretation affect the speed and substan-
tive direction of planning drift. Planning drift can begin immediately
after legislation, depending on client demand for expert interpreta-
tions and whether entrepreneurial practitioners develop novel legal
strategies using the new law.40 For example, wealthy individuals his-
torically have paid only token estate and gift taxes, notwithstanding
consistently high statutory rates and periodic loophole-closing legisla-
tion. Among experts in estate and gift tax, the conventional wisdom is
that private planning is highly responsive to legislative change.41 Al-
ternatively, consensus may emerge slowly among private practitioners
about how to read a statute, and, if these advisors are risk-averse, they
may give systematically overcautious advice.42 In addition, private
parties' demand for specific legal interpretations may rise and fall
based on economic conditions. As a result, planning drift may evolve
slowly or in periods of punctuated equilibrium. This point is illus-
trated by the periodic waves of corporate inversions since the early
1980's, in which new legal strategies emerged idiosyncratically in re-
sponse to market conditions.43 For these reasons, planning drift is
highly situational and depends heavily on the relevant public and pri-
vate actors, as well as the policy at stake.
2. Policy Communities
Although private interpretations represent the building blocks for
planning drift, these interpretations still must translate into policy
39 See Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Busi-
ness Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 47,
51-52 (2001) ("[E]xperienced tax professionals can usually readily distinguish tax shelters
from real transactions.").
40 See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawmakers and Private
Lawmaking, 18 L. & Soc. Inquiry 423 (1993) (discussing the evolution of "poison pills").
Private practitioners also may affect policy through direct contact with legislators and regu-
lators-that is, through lobbying. To the extent that lobbying activities inform government
actors about the content of, or persuade them about the rationale behind, private interpre-
tations, these activities may play a role in planning drift. If lobbying activities represent a
more straightforward purchase and sale of legislation, as under a public choice model, then
planning drift is not implicated.
41 See George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax
Avoidance, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 161, 162-63 (1977) (arguing that, after statutory reforms in
1976, "today's multimillionaires, as well as persons of lesser wealth, no more need pay a
stiff estate and gift tax than did their predecessors").
42 See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role
of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 375 (1997).
43 See Hal Hicks, Overview of Inversion Transactions: Selected Historical, Contempo-
rary, and Transactional Perspectives, 30 Tax Notes Int'l 899 (June 2, 2003); see also text
accompanying notes 108-10.
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change, and the concept of policy communities helps bridge this gap.44
Policy communities are networks of public and private political actors
that facilitate planning drift by allowing the circulation of private
practitioners' legal interpretations and policy judgments.45 To the ex-
tent these interpretations and judgments become known and accepted
within a policy community, they can affect community members' prac-
tices. These practices can lead to de facto policy change, unless the
legislature or an agency intervenes. Even if government intervenes,
these practices can shape public policy by affecting the substantive
content of the intervention, resulting in planning drift.46 In addition,
if public-sector experts and private-sector experts belong to the same
policy community, public-sector experts may be persuaded by private
legal interpretations (and any concomitant policy positions) that circu-
late within the policy community.47 Again, planning drift occurs. In
these ways, policy communities represent an important part of the
mechanism of planning drift, and their existence across the public-pri-
vate divide distinguishes planning from phenomena such as agency
capture, in which private actors exert unidirectional influence over
44 The policy community literature has both a British strand, see David Marsh &
R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy Networks in British Government 13-14, 249-68 (1992); Grant Jor-
dan & Paul Cairney, What Is the "Dominant Model" of British Policymaking? Comparing
Majoritarian and Policy Community Ideas, 8 Brit. Pol. 233, 238 (2013), and a U.S. strand,
see John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies 124 (1984); Hugh Heclo,
Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in The New American Political System
87 (Anthony King ed., 1978). The British strand has developed the concept more com-
pletely, and this Article draws significantly on this scholarship, as well as Julian Zelizer's
work on the post-World War II tax policy community and the insights of the new institu-
tionalism in political science and history. See Julian E. Zelizer, Taxing America: Wilbur
D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945-1975, at 8-11, 117-18, 362-65 (1998); The Demo-
cratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History (Meg Jacobs, William J.
Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2003). For general reviews of the policy community litera-
ture, see Keith Dowding, Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network
Approach, 43 Pol. Stud. 136 (1995); Grant Jordan, Policy Community Realism Versus
"New" Institutionalist Ambiguity, 38 Pol. Stud. 470 (1990). To some extent, policy commu-
nities provide an alternative to more deterministic political science models such as "iron
triangles," which describe rigid alliances among members of Congress, administrative
agencies, and special interests. See HeclQ, supra, at 88 ("[T]he iron triangle concept is not
so much wrong as it is disastrously incomplete."); Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles
of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev.
889, 977-78 (2008) ("The idea that the President better represents the public interest be-
cause he faces a national electorate and that members of Congress operate only in 'iron
triangles' with special interests lacks needed complexity.").
45 The idea of experts forming influential, semi-autonomous groups draws on the litera-
ture on historical institutionalism. See Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic
Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies,
1862-1928 (2001); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion
of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (1982).
46 See Subsection II.A.4.
47 See Gergen, note 31, at 138 ("In a novel case the best guide may well be professional
common knowledge.").
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regulators. This Subsection discusses policy communities and the
ways in which they affect planning drift, and then concludes with an
example from taxation.
Policy communities are stable, restricted networks of people ori-
ented toward, and connected by their interest in, a specific area of
public policy. Policy communities are characterized by their member-
ship, organization, distribution of authority, and autonomy, although
not every policy community has all of these traits to the same degree.
Unlike other informal networks of political actors, policy communities
have limited membership. Although not regulated in a formal sense,
policy communities' membership typically reflects shared professional
or economic backgrounds and interests, as well as expertise on specific
policy issues. In terms of organization, policy communities are highly
integrated, in the sense that they are bound together by similar politi-
cal values, language, and culture, which are disseminated and rein-
forced by interpersonal interactions and community institutions.
Notwithstanding these common interests, policy communities are not
necessarily ideologically homogeneous or static in their prevailing be-
liefs. Rather than dictating members' policy positions, policy commu-
nities recognize the legitimacy of outcomes generated through
members' common intellectual framework. Authority within a policy
community is distributed and nonhierarchical. All members have
some voice in the community, though some members' voices may
carry more weight than others. Policy communities are substantially
autonomous, in that they operate outside of ordinary electoral politics
and majoritarian influence. While policy communities may engage
with and respond to the broader political environment, they are more
accountable to internal forces than external ones.48 Finally, it is im-
portant to note that policy communities are like unhappy families:
Each community functions in idiosyncratic ways that depend on its
membership, policy focus, history, and relationship to other political
institutions.
49
Policy communities affect public policy through internal debates,
the sharing of information, and the development of interpretive
norms. Internal debates and information sharing may be formal or
informal and mediated by individual members or community institu-
48 See Zelizer, note 44, at 10 (arguing that a "culture of tax policy" gave "a considerable
degree of coherence" to the tax policy community); Kingdon, note 44, at 124 (arguing that
a policy community "hums along on its own, independent of such political events as
changes of administration and pressure from legislators' constituencies").
49 These idiosyncrasies, in part, motivate this Article's case study approach. See, e.g.,
Marsh & Rhodes, note 44 (presenting eight case studies on various substantive topics).
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
2016]
TAX LAW REVIEW
tions.50 Critical is that practitioners' interpretations and policy judg-
ments circulate among a receptive group of experts. Policy
communities also can function as "interpretive communities," groups
with "mutuality of interpretation" and "shared and informed under-
standings" about the law's meaning and application.51 These under-
standings, which themselves are negotiated and contested within the
community, can apply to both interstitial interpretations (creating
"certainty") and reconstructive interpretations (precluding "creative
compliance").52 Practitioner interpretations, if crafted in accordance
with community norms, may persuade other members to adopt similar
views. For planning drift to occur, these interpretations do not have
to dominate the community but instead only need to be plausible and
justifiable under community norms. For example, influential practi-
tioners' views may be prominent enough to affect subsequent govern-
ment responses, even if they represent a minority position within the
policy community. Similarly, minority positions may affect practice to
an extent that government must either respond to or effectively per-
mit such interpretations. Both of these outcomes can result in plan-
ning drift. Policy communities may, but do not have to, include
experts from both the private and public sectors. In this case, infor-
mation sharing, debates, and prevailing interpretations can transmit
private practitioners' legal interpretations to public officials. Where
public officials adopt these private interpretations and the policy posi-
tions they entail, planning drift occurs.
53
An example of a policy community is the group of lawyers and
other experts, inside and outside of government, involved with tax
policy in the United States.54 This tax policy community reflects a
strong substantive focus, and is characterized by personal, profes-
sional, and intellectual connections, some of which cross the tradi-
tional boundary between public and private. Although legal training
and bar passage initiate lawyers into a closed community of like-
50 Information sharing also may include formal political activities, such as lobbying. See
note 40.
51 See Julia Black, Rules and Regulators 30-37 (1997).
52 See id. (drawing on Stanley Fish's term).
53 Officials can influence rulemaking directly, when, for example, they themselves work
on a regulatory initiative, or indirectly, by circulating their policy views within the relevant
agency-or by not acting at all.
54 These experts include nonlawyer interpreters of the Code such as accountants, who
frequently make judgments when determining reporting positions that require the inter-
pretation of statutes, regulations, and other legal authorities. For current and historical
examples of these types of judgments, see Susan B. Schwab, Bringing Down the Bar: Ac-
countants Challenge Meaning of Unauthorized Practice, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1425, 1425-27
(2000) ("For the past decade, accountants have been slowly encroaching into territory that
was once within the sole domain of the legal profession.").
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minded professionals,5 5 training in tax law is even more specialized.
Members of the tax policy community are connected by professional
affiliations with bar associations, such as the tax sections of the Amer-
ican Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association, discus-
sion groups such as the Tax Club and Tax Forum, and employment or
partnership at elite law firms.56 The tax policy community is close-
knit and integrated, both through the exchange of personnel among
the public and private sectors (sometimes called a "revolving door")
and through common institutions, such as tax-specific practitioner
publications, conferences, and educational events.57 Many voices
carry weight in the tax policy community, which makes it reasonably
democratic.58 Finally, the tax policy community operates largely au-
tonomously from conventional political cycles. These features give
coherence to the tax policy community and also enable the dissemina-
tion of ideas that can lead to planning drift.
3. First-Mover Advantage
Once private practitioners' legal interpretations gain currency
within the relevant policy community, these interpretations can lead
to planning drift by giving private practitioners a first-mover advan-
tage in the interpretation of new legislation. This first-mover advan-
tage manifests itself in three ways, discussed below. Private
practitioners' first-mover advantage can allow private parties to cap-
ture benefits with respect to new statutes-benefits that accrue only
because private practitioners take the first interpretive cut at
legislation.
First, significant time often elapses between legislation and
rulemaking, and this period gives private practitioners an opportunity
to make initial attempts at legal analysis. In order to issue regula-
tions, agencies not only must develop substantive expertise, but they
55 See Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and
Process, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109, 113 (1998) (arguing that legal training "brings
with it a complex socialization process in which 'civilians' are transformed not only into
lawyers, but also into members of an elite, powerful, highly selective, special interest
group: the legal profession.").
56 See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1167,
1215-16 (2005).
57 See, e.g., Schizer, note 14, at 348-49 (advocating increased personnel exchange be-
tween private practice and public service). Tax Notes, a periodical for the tax community,
publishes a biweekly summary of "personnel changes within the tax community." These
summaries illustrate the flows of people between the public and private sectors, as well as
among law and accounting firms. See, e.g., Andy Sheets, Moves and Appointments, 2016
TNT 117-12 (Jun. 17, 2016), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
58 For example, Tax Notes and Taxes: The Tax Magazine publish articles by a wide
range of practitioners from across the United States.
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also must become versed in the underlying statute, including its scope,
content, and purpose. Agencies, however, face resource constraints in
developing this type of knowledge, especially compared to larger and
better-funded groups of private practitioners.59 The legislature also
may impose procedures that build delay into the rulemaking process
through, for example, notice and comment requirements.60 Because
planning drift can begin at any time after the legislature enacts a stat-
ute, while formal rulemaking generally occurs only after some delay,
private practitioners have an opportunity to develop statutory inter-
pretations before regulators.61 These interpretations may circulate
within the policy community, potentially crossing public-private lines,
and practitioners may draw on these interpretations to advocate for
their preferred policies before regulators or legislators.62 In this way,
practitioners' early interpretations of statutes can set the trajectory for
agency rulemaking and any subsequent legislative correction, leading
to planning drift.
A second first-mover advantage is that private practitioners' legal
interpretations also operate as a form of agenda control with respect
to subsequent rulemaking and legislative interventions. Again, the
timing of these legal interpretations is important. Assume that, when
legislation is enacted, the agency charged with implementation prefers
Policy A, the same policy preferred by the enacting legislature. The
agency is resource-constrained, and procedural requirements impose a
delay between enactment and rulemaking. During this delay, private
practitioners produce interstitial and reconstructive interpretations of
the statute for their clients, and some of these interpretations imple-
ment Policy B, which differs from Policy A. If these interpretations
become known within the policy community, the relevant agency risks
the implication that these interpretations "work" unless addressed
59 See Schizer, note 14, at 334-35, 338-39.
60 Scholars have cited the delay caused by administrative procedures, such as those
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as a possible constraint on bureaucratic
drift. See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, note 17, at 440-43. This delay, how-
ever, generally empowers future legislatures and risks legislative drift. This tension has
been described as the "drift trade-off." See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coali-
tional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 111, 115
(1992).
61 The speed of planning drift depends on the specifics of legal interpretation, including
client demand, as well as the dynamics of the relevant policy community. See text accom-
panying notes 40-43, 50-53.
62 For example, in informal agency rulemaking, lawyers often "provide legal arguments
for interpreting the relevant statute consistently with their clients' positions, present tech-
nical and economic studies in the light most favorable to their positions, and marshal policy
arguments to support their preferred outcomes." Thomas 0. McGarrity, Administrative
Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L.J. 1671, 1748
(2012); see also note 40.
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specifically in rulemaking. Reconstructive interpretations create loop-
holes that require targeted fixes, while interstitial interpretations can
cause practitioners to focus the agency's attention on specific gaps in
the law to the exclusion of other ambiguities. The agency cannot sim-
ply promulgate rules consistent with Policy A; it also must repudiate
Policy B. These remedial efforts have opportunity costs, in that they
divert the agency's finite resources away from efforts to implement its
preferred policy, as well as potential structural costs, in that legal or
policy mistakes in remedial rulemaking may have unintended or ad-
verse consequences going forward. These additional costs lead to
planning drift.
63
Finally, once an interpretation becomes prevalent among private
practitioners, they and their clients may develop a sense of entitle-
ment to that legal rule.64 Private parties often advance reliance argu-
ments to justify a continuation of the status quo, even when those
same parties previously played a role in constructing that status quo.
65
This resistance to legal change is consistent with theories in behavioral
economics that legal entitlements may cost more to remove than to
create.66 Private parties may fight to maintain existing legal interpre-
tations even when, under a public choice approach to legislation and
regulation, they would not have been willing to spend the capital nec-
essary to achieve these interpretations through the formal political
process.
Private practitioners' first-mover advantage is evident in the Wall
Street Rule,67 which stands for the proposition that the IRS will not
63 Similarly, future legislatures must account for planners' interpretations when crafting
subsequent legislation in the same policy space.
64 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income
Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 74-75 (1977) (discussing and dismissing the idea of
"fairness as reliance" for taxpayers' "institutionally induced expectations"); David M.
Hasen, Legal Transitions and the Problem of Reliance, 1 Colum. J. Tax Law 120, 155-56
(2010) (responding to Graetz's critique).
65 For example, tax lawyers and their clients have used reliance arguments to resist car-
ried interest reform, which would deny favorable tax treatment to returns on certain part-
nership interests held by investment fund managers. See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced,
Dealbook: Schwarzman's Unfortunate War Analogy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 2010. Simi-
larly, tax practitioners have argued against contractions in the scope of activities that can
be conducted by publicly traded partnerships, citing the potential for such changes to "roil
markets." See Amy S. Elliott, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: PTP Ruling Pause Ex-
pected to Be Short, 143 Tax Notes 769 (May 19, 2014) (quoting Robert J. Crnkovich).
66 Under the endowment effect, individuals value an object that they possess more than
the same object held by someone else. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 1 J.
Econ. Persp. 193, 194 (1991). For an argument that legal compliance itself implicates the
endowment effect, see David E. DePianto, Sticky Compliance: An Endowment Account
of Expressive Law, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 327, 349-56.
67 See text accompanying notes 8-12.
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challenge tax positions accepted within the private practitioner com-
munity.68 Under the classic formulation of the Wall Street Rule with
respect to financial products, once issuers have released a substantial
dollar amount of a financial instrument to the public, private practi-
tioners assume that the IRS will defer to the issuers' treatment of the
instrument for federal income tax purposes.69 By taking the initiative
with respect to a legal position, private practitioners in effect can fore-
close the IRS's preferred policy.70 Sometimes, the IRS explicitly ac-
cepts private legal interpretations by issuing formal guidance
consistent with "Wall Street practice," even when the guidance does
not clearly follow from either a plain reading of the relevant statute or
general policy principles. For example, in Revenue Ruling 2002-31,
71
the IRS essentially adopted some practitioners' treatment of certain
contingent convertible debt instruments. This treatment granted sig-
nificantly higher interest deductions to issuers than alternative treat-
ments that also had significant support within the tax policy
community.72 Although commentators and the IRS acknowledged
the complexity of the underlying policy issues, the IRS hewed towards
a more generous position, even as it called for further comments from
practitioners on the issue.73 The Wall Street Rule illustrates how prac-
titioners' ability to interpret statutes immediately after enactment can
generate planning drift.
4. Legislative and Agency Interventions
Where private practitioners' legal interpretations diverge from an
enacting legislature's policy preferences with respect to a statute, a
subsequent legislature and the relevant administrative agency may
68 The Wall Street Rule in taxation also is known as the "de Kosmian rule." See Jasper
L. Cummings, Jr., Letter to the Editor: A Short History Lesson, 86 Tax Notes 1169 (Feb.
21, 2000).
69 See Blank, note 8, at 1654-55; Fleischer, note 8, at 286-87.
70 Indeed, IRS protests against the Wall Street Rule and practitioners' outrage when the
rule is violated both speak to the rule's power. But see Sam Young & Lee A. Sheppard,
Korb Slams Textron Ruling, Wall Street Rule, 117 Tax Notes 204, 204 (Oct. 15, 2007)
(quoting IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb as saying, "Nothing is too big or too old," al-
though he had no specific targets in mind); Robert S. Bernstein, Wall Street Rule Broken;
IRS Challenges Commodity Mutual Funds, 33 Corp. Tax'n 36 (2006) (arguing that Rev.
Rul. 2006-1, 2006-1 C.B. 261, which reversed some practitioners' opinions that commodity
derivative swaps were qualifying assets and produced qualifying income for purposes of the
regulated investment company tests under § 851, "had the effect of drawing into question
the continued tax qualification of one or more of the nation's largest and fastest growing
mutual funds").
71 Rev. Rul. 2002-31, 2002-1 C.B. 1023.
72 See Dana L. Trier & Lucy W. Farr, Rev. Rul. 2002-31 and the Taxation of Contingent
Convertibles, Part 1, 95 Tax Notes 1963, 1964 (June 24, 2002).
73 See Notice 2002-36, 2002-1 C.B. 1029.
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adopt the divergent interpretations, either expressly or through inac-
tion, or intervene to correct the divergent interpretations. Express
adoption by the legislature or an agency leads to planning drift; the
more interesting situations involve government inaction and interven-
tions. This Subsection first addresses government inaction, and then
turns to legislative and administrative interventions.
Planning drift does not require express government action by either
an agency or the legislature. Instead, inaction with respect to private
practitioners' legal interpretations can result in policy change. Critical
to the analysis are the facts that government decisionmaking is coali-
tional and that government preferences are heterogeneous. These
facts make it less likely that the legislature or an agency will be able to
summon the collective impetus to act. The basic model of bureau-
cratic drift illustrates this point with respect to legislative action. In a
simplified version of the legislative process, called the "statute game,"
the legislature is composed of three members-the House, the Senate,
and the President-each of which effectively has veto power over new
legislation. In order to pass, a statute must improve on existing public
policy from each member's perspective.74 Under the reasonable as-
sumption that each member has different policy preferences, the stat-
ute's content depends on each member's relative bargaining power
and-critically-existing law, which determines the value of the new
policy to each member. That is, the starting point of existing law, in-
cluding any private legal interpretations of that law, determines how
much better or worse the new policy is for each member of the legisla-
ture.75 If private practitioners interpret the statute in a way inconsis-
tent with the new policy, legislative correction is possible only if the
policy represented by the practitioners' interpretations is undesirable
for each of the three members. Because each member can veto, no
legislative correction is possible if at least one member prefers the
practitioners' interpretations.76 If no legislative correction occurs,
then these interpretations are de facto incorporated into public policy,
and planning drift results. Although administrative agencies typically
lack members with formal veto authority, inaction by agencies-a
74 That is, the statute must fall within the legislature's Pareto optimal set, in which all
three members are better off and no member is worse off. See McCubbins et al., Structure
and Process, note 17, at 439.
75 See id. at 432-33. This simplified model ignores features of the legislative process,
such as committees and constitutional constraints (including the requirement that revenue
bills originate in the House), as well as the possibility that the Senate and House them-
selves require internal coalitions. Adding these features only reinforces the path depen-
dence of policy change. See DeShazo & Freeman, note 26, at 1517 (arguing "that agency
policy decisions might track the multiple and potentially contradictory messages they re-
ceive from Congress" with the result that bureaucratic drift presents less of a problem).
76 The same is true for legislative corrections of bureaucratic drift.
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very real phenomenon-also allows practitioners' interpretations to
continue uncorrected.
If legislative action is possible, the policy content of the legislative
intervention depends on another round of the statute game. In the
interim, the legislative coalition may have changed, preventing the
prior coalition's policy from being re-enacted.77 Furthermore, the leg-
islature plays the second round of the statute game with a new starting
point: the first round's law as interpreted by private practitioners.
Even if the first round's coalition remains intact, the second round of
the statute game will produce different results to the extent coalition
members have different preferences with respect to practitioners' in-
terpretations.78 According to McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast:
[T]his is the problem of "history dependence" or "reactive
enforcement" in legislative processes.... [T]he outcome of a
legislative attempt to rectify an act of noncompliance by an
agency [or, in this case, private actors] will not, in general,
reproduce the policy outcome that was sought by the win-
ning coalition, even if the preferences of the members of the
legislative body remain unchanged.
79
In this sense, policy change is path dependent, and changes in law,
even through private interpretation, can preclude a full recovery of
the enacting legislature's policy preferences.80
77 It is possible that planning drift (or bureaucratic drift, or a combination of the two)
can exactly compensate for changes in the enacting coalition, with the result that the new
coalition's policy preferences match those of the enacting coalition. This outcome requires
extraordinary coincidence. See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, note 17, at 439.
78 See Horn & Shepsle, note 18, at 502.
79 Id. at 433.
80 In taxation, some scholars have described the promulgation-planning-correction pro-
cess as a "cat-and-mouse" game between the government and taxpayers. See, e.g., George
K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54
SMU L. Rev. 209, 216-17 (2001); Cunningham & Repetti, note 20, at 33; see also Schizer,
note 35, at 1314-15 (arguing that incremental reforms "[s]ometimes ... stop the targeted
transaction" but "in other cases taxpayers press on, tweaking the deal just enough to side-
step the reform."). The cat-and-mouse metaphor implies a stalemate in which both parties'
goals are fixed and unachievable. The cat (Congress or Treasury) cannot capture the mice
(taxpayers), and the mice reciprocally cannot escape the cat. This Article argues that this
iterative interaction is not a stalemate, but instead can lead to policy change. For example,
the cat is not a unitary decisionmaker but instead a coalition of political actors. See text
accompanying notes 77-84. Because private practitioners and government actors are in
dialogue with each other, this iterative process affects how law and policy develop. See,
e.g., Picciotto, note 33, at 19-21 ("The various interactions between the tax authorities and
the professional advisers of internationally operating businesses over a long period of time
helped to construct he international tax system") (emphasis in the original).
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 69:
TAX PLANNING AND POLICY DRIFT
Agency rulemaking also can correct private practitioners' legal in-
terpretations.81 These administrative corrections are unlikely, how-
ever, to reflect the agency's preferred policy in the absence of private
practitioners' interpretative efforts, even if the corrections disallow or
reverse practitioners' interpretations. Like legislation, rulemaking
emerges from a coalition of interests. Agency organization and
rulemaking processes, accountability to different legislative and ad-
ministrative principals, and personal policy convictions combine to
make rulemaking a heterogeneous process.82 Although agency offi-
cials may not be able to veto regulations, they can affect regulations'
timing and content through their formal or informal roles in the
rulemaking process.8 3 Officials whose policy preferences align with
private interpretations of a statute have an advantage in the regula-
tory process, since agency inaction and delay represent "good" out-
comes from these officials' perspectives. For this reason, the starting
point for rulemaking matters, and administrative interventions are
likely to differ from the agency's preferred rulemaking in the absence
of any private interpretations. Agency heterogeneity implies that reg-
ulation is path dependent, and that, as in legislation, agency correc-
tions reflect private interpretations between the enactment of a
statute and rulemaking.8 4 In this way, private interpretations affect
the path of agency rulemaking and lead to planning drift.8 5
81 These corrections, of course, can result in bureaucratic drift.
82 See DeShazo & Freeman, note 26; James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder,
Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal
vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57 L. & Contemp. Probs. 111 (1994);
Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy,
in Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond 116, 143-46
(Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990).
83 In taxation, the Office of Chief Counsel, formally located in the IRS, prepares the
initial draft of regulations, often with input from an attorney-advisor from Treasury's Of-
fice of Tax Policy and other personnel at Treasury or the IRS. One or more reviewers
(typically, attorney-advisors or supervisory personnel at Treasury) must approve the draft.
Next, the draft is circulated for comment to other personnel at the IRS and Treasury, as
well as front-office IRS officials. Then, the draft goes to the Chief Counsel, the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy for
final sign-off, after which proposed regulations are published in the Federal Register. Pro-
posed regulations often reflect a consensus among these various constituents that emerges
through debate and compromise. See IRC § 7803(b); Reg. § 601.601(a)(1); IRM 32.1.1
(Sept. 23, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm-32-001-001.html; Michael
Saltzman & Leslie Book, IRS Practice and Procedure 3.02 [3] (2013); see also Amy S.
Elliott, Treasury Officials Explain New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules, 142 Tax Notes
904 (Mar. 3, 2014) (quoting a Treasury official who stated that "[t]here were a lot of inter-
nal debates" on the proposed regulations regarding bottom-dollar guarantees in leveraged
partnerships).
84 If agencies are unitary actors, then the starting point does not matter, and agencies
can make rules that reflect any policy (subject to correction by the legislature).
85 Given the modern administrative state's extensive reliance on private parties to im-
plement legislation, a savvy legislature may anticipate planning drift and adjust legislation
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The foregoing analysis, like much of the drift literature, treats law
and public policy as continuous, while in practice either may be dis-
crete or discontinuous.86 In these situations, legislative and adminis-
trative interventions are more likely to be able to recover the enacting
legislature's preferred policy. For example, assume that a policy do-
main has only two options, Policy A and Policy B, with no intermedi-
ate positions. The legislature intends to enact Policy A using a
particular statute, but private interpretations of the statute implement
Policy B. If the relevant agency's reaction to these private interpreta-
tions is to promulgate rules reflecting Policy A, then, after agency
rulemaking, there is no net policy drift with respect to the enacting
legislature's preferences. Administrative action intended to stop tax
shelters may follow this pattern.87 Whether law and policy is continu-
ous or discrete is a question of degree and context, but the menu of
options is rarely as narrow as in the foregoing example. In many situ-
ations, the range of policy and legal choices available to legislatures
and agencies means that private interpretations are likely to affect the
content of these actors' corrections and thus policy development.
B. Factors that Facilitate Planning Drift
Planning drift does not affect all legislation or areas of law
equally.88 This Section discusses various factors that facilitate plan-
accordingly. As a positive matter, however, Congress and the President generally do not
enact legislation that explicitly anticipates planning drift, and, in practice, this legislative
strategy is complicated and risky. To anticipate planning drift, the legislature must know
private practitioners' policy preferences and interpretive predilections. Accurate informa-
tion may be costly or difficult to obtain. Furthermore, ex ante predictions of planning drift
may have a high variance, yielding a substantial range of potential policy outcomes. Be-
cause planning drift occurs over time, the legislature also must tolerate some period of
suboptimal policy following enactment. For these reasons, a risk-averse legislature may
prefer strategies that limit or avoid planning drift to strategies that anticipate and incorpo-
rate private interpretations. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 53 (2008); see also Sections I.C and IV.A. Finally, for this
legislative strategy to work, a policy position that incorporates planning drift must exist
and also be political palatable. Unless the electorate also accounts for planning drift, the
legislature may be unable to enact legislation that anticipates planning drift without facing
adverse political consequences.
86 Cf. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, note 17, at 494 (discussing EPA regula-
tions and arguing that if they "were imposed discontinuously-in the form of a one-time
substantial cost shock-some firms could be bankrupted and some facilities closed.").
87 For example, the IRS designates "listed" transactions that taxpayers must disclose,
effectively preventing these or similar transactions from occurring. See IRC § 6707A; see
also Notice 99-55, 1999-2 C.B. 761.
88 The same is true for bureaucratic drift and legislative drift. See, e.g., David Schoen-
brod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. Rev.
740, 783-89 (1983) (differentiating between "goals statutes" and "rules statutes" in terms
of interpretive discretion and flexibility).
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ning drift. This list is representative rather than exclusive; it provides
guidance about where planning drift may occur. To confirm whether
planning drift affects specific legislation or an area of law, it is neces-
sary to perform a more in-depth study of the facts, policy, and people
involved.
1. Technical Areas of Law
In general, the more technical an area of law, the more likely that
planning drift will affect it.89 Technical areas of law have two impor-
tant characteristics: They are complex, and they foster specialization
by the experts charged with their interpretation. Complex areas of
law have many interrelated pieces expressed through esoteric termi-
nology within an intricate structure. Legal consequences depend on
detailed, comprehensive analysis, and small changes in inputs or legal
interpretations may cause large variations in outcomes.90 In addition,
complexity increases opportunities for legal interpretations by foster-
ing gaps that require interstitial interpretations and interrelated provi-
sions that facilitate manipulation through reconstructive
interpretations. If government actors, such as administrative agencies,
face resource constraints, they may have trouble policing private legal
interpretations that involve technical areas of law. Technical areas of
law increase the opportunities for interpretation as well as the poten-
tial benefits of favorable interpretations.
The choice between rules and standards in legislation also has impli-
cations for complexity, and therefore for planning drift. As categories
of legal instruments, rules provide ex ante guidance, while standards
are developed ex post. Legal complexity does not necessarily depend
on the choice between rules and standards. If the law's essential con-
tent is complex, then both rules and standards will reflect this com-
plexity after full development.91 In certain situations, however, the
rules or standards choice has implications for complexity. If private
practitioners are especially active in an area of law, they may take
advantage of the certainty surrounding rules to develop reconstructive
interpretations that contravene the enacting legislature's policy pref-
erences. These interpretations may become common, requiring addi-
tional rules to guide private practitioners and foreclose these
89 Like the other items discussed in this Section, the technical nature of law falls on a
continuum rather than a binary.
90 See Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of
the Management of Tax Detail, 34 L. & Contemp. Probs. 673 (1969); see also Weisbach,
note 9, at 867-68 (describing complexity "as the number of lines or the degree to which the
lines match the underlying terrain in a topological map").
91 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557
(1992).
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reconstructive interpretations. The result is a vicious circle of increas-
ingly complex rules. The intrinsic uncertainty surrounding standards
can interrupt this positive feedback loop, depending on how the rele-
vant policy community interprets the standard.92 To the extent that
rules correlate with complexity (and they may in areas of law other-
wise subject to planning drift), planning drift is more likely to occur
with respect to rule-bound areas of law.93
Technical areas of law also encourage specialization by practition-
ers, and this specialization nurtures the policy communities that medi-
ate planning drift. Specialization binds a policy community together
in several ways. Specialization-specific credentials, experience, and
affiliations identify members of the policy community and effectively
exclude nonmembers, creating a collar on community membership.
Too few participants preclude a cognizable and meaningful commu-
nity, while too many members risk a breakdown of community bonds.
In this way, specialization provides a vehicle for integrating the policy
community. Shared subject matter-inaccessible to outsiders-cre-
ates a foundation for the types of interactions and institutions that
encourage a cohesive policy community. Specialization also rein-
forces a policy community's autonomy. As members consolidate au-
thority within their specialization, outsiders may defer to the policy
community's judgments or reasoning on the basis of this expertise.
Even if outsiders do not defer to the policy community, they may find
the debate difficult or impossible to engage. Voices within the policy
community may carry more weight relative to outsiders, and the pol-
icy community may gain separation and independence from formal
political institutions. Out of these types of specialized policy commu-
nities come the private interpretations that drive planning drift.
Tax law provides an example of how a technical area of law can lead
to planning drift. With its nuanced structure, jargon, and intercon-
nected provisions, tax law generally meets the criteria of complexity.94
The tax provisions for corporations may be complex not only as a pos-
itive matter but perhaps also structurally.95 Corporate tax law has
92 If practitioners develop their own interpretations of standards, the uncertainty sur-
rounding standards may be overstated. As a result, the differences in complexity between
rules and standards may be overstated under Weisbach's "common becoming uncommon"
argument. See Weisbach, note 9, at 869.
93 See id. at 872-77; Kaplow, note 91.
94 See Tanina Rostain & Milton C. Regan, Jr., Confidence Games: Lawyers, Account-
ants, and the Tax Shelter Industry 7 (2014) ("Tax practice is extremely complex, and tax
lawyers inevitably must exercise considerable discretion.").
95 See David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes:
Theory and Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 Tax L. Rev. 215, 215 (2007) (arguing that
"[t]here is no way out" of the dilemma between theoretically pure corporate taxation and
an administrable system).
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produced a robust policy community of public and private experts-a
policy community evidenced by significant barriers to entry, circula-
tion of ideas through both formal and informal means, and ready ex-
change of personnel between public service and private practice.
Private experts' legal interpretations have influenced the contours of
corporate tax law. Private practitioners, for example, have inter-
preted pro-taxpayer corporate tax regimes, such as the rules exempt-
ing qualifying REITs from corporate-level tax, in expansive ways that
have garnered acceptance among both public and private experts.
96
2. Sophisticated Targets
Planning drift is more likely when legislation affects sophisticated
targets.97 For this purpose, sophistication implies an active awareness
of and engagement with the legal environment, either in general or on
specific issues. Sophisticated targets often view the law as a tool
rather than an imperative, and they may hire specialized experts to
plan and structure their activities.9 Legislation does not have to tar-
get sophisticated taxpayers specifically for planning drift to occur. In
corporate taxation, for example, a relatively small number of highly
sophisticated taxpayers drive demand for high-level legal interpreta-
tions and tax planning.99 The resulting planning drift has implications
for the entire corporate sector. In this way, a few sophisticated targets
can produce planning drift with respect to generally applicable areas
of law.
3. Delay Before Agency Interpretation
One of the central findings of the drift literature is that the legisla-
ture can use delay between legislation and agency interpretation to
manage bureaucratic drift.100 More onerous administrative proce-
dures give the legislature time to intervene before a wayward agency
96 See text accompanying note 34.
97 See Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74
U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 668-71 (2007) ("Sophisticated taxpayers are more likely to develop
tax-driven contractual norms [that facilitate tax planning] than those lacking tax and finan-
cial acumen.")
98 See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775
(June 21, 1999); Fleischer, note 8, at 281-82. But see Raskolnikov, note 97, at 670 ("It is
not [always] crystal clear who is sophisticated and who is not.").
99 For example, in 2011, the top 0.05% of corporate taxpayers earned more than half of
the gross receipts reported by the entire corporate sector. See IRS, Statistics of Income
2011: Corporation Income Tax Returns 35-36 tbl.2 (2013), available at https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/11coccr.pdf.
100 Delay also may result from shirking by the relevant agency, which leads to bureau-
cratic drift. See Gersen & O'Connell, note 17, at 932-33.
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promulgates final rules.10 1 Process-driven delays also allow diffuse in-
terest groups to educate themselves, organize, and lobby for their pre-
ferred policy.102 If the legislature uses delay to manage bureaucratic
drift, one cost may be increased planning drift, which operates in the
same temporal space between legislation and agency rulemaking.
10 3
Significant delay also may allow tax practitioners to overcome any risk
aversion associated with filling statutory gaps and implementing novel
transactional structures. As legislation ages, tax practitioners may be-
come comfortable with their peers' more aggressive legal interpreta-
tions, both interstitial and reconstructive, and these minority
interpretations may become mainstream within the tax policy
community.
104
As a result, statutes that impose delay-causing procedures on agen-
cies, either under the APA or in addition to it, are more likely to pro-
duce planning drift. By contrast, the legislature may constrain
planning drift by delegating to agencies that engage in significant
amounts of informalrulemaking (that is, agency actions not subject to
formal APA procedures).10 5 Treasury, for example, takes the position
that most of its regulations are interpretive and not subject to APA
requirements, and Treasury also issues substantial amounts of infor-
mal guidance. For example, before Mayo Foundation for Medical Ed-
ucation and Research v. United States,0 6 Treasury frequently engaged
in informal rulemaking procedures, taking the position that many of
its regulations were interpretive and exempt from formal APA proce-
dures. In addition, Treasury historically has issued substantial
amounts of informal guidance, as well as solicited input from regu-
lated parties before finalizing its position.107 Prompt formal or infor-
101 McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, note 17, at 441-43.
102 Macey, note 17, at 675-76; see Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Ex-
pertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 Duke L.J. 1763, 1795-96 (2012) (discussing how
delay can result when one agency regulates another).
103 Delay has other costs. Delay defers the potential benefits of good (or uncontrover-
sial) rulemaking. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, note 17, at 443. Diffuse interest
groups also may dissipate in the interim, leaving only well-organized, persistent special
interests to participate in the administrative process. Macey, note 17, at 675-76.
104 This process is idiosyncratic, in that the tax policy community does not adopt all
aggressive positions.
105 The containment of planning drift may be a salutary effect of the "ossification" of
administrative rulemaking, in which agencies eschew cumbersome notice-and-comment
rulemaking in favor of informal rulemaking. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992).
106 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
107 Informal rulemaking includes actions ranging from policy statements to administra-
tive adjudication. In practice, the line between formal and informal rulemaking frequently
is unclear. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1727 (2007).
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mal rulemaking, however, does not necessarily prevent planning drift,
the speed of which depends on the area of law and the relevant policy
community. Delay facilitates planning drift but is not necessary for it
to occur.
4. Unsettled Policy
To the extent that the policy underlying new legislation remains un-
settled among private practitioners and government actors, planning
drift is more likely to occur. Policy communities are not homogene-
ous, and their internal logic and processes can support multiple legiti-
mate views on the relevant policy. If legislation does not settle these
internal policy debates, private interpretations are more likely to gain
currency within the policy community. Furthermore, unsettled policy
may divide legislators, regulators, and private practitioners in differ-
ent ways. The legislature or regulators (or both) may disagree with
private practitioners, or vice versa. Finally, all three parties may agree
about policy, in which case no (or only limited) planning drift occurs.
Examples from taxation below illustrate each of these three scenarios.
Legislative and regulatory efforts to deter corporate inversions, in
which multinational corporations organized in the United States effec-
tively reincorporate in low-tax foreign jurisdictions, show the effects
of unsettled policy that divide the legislature and private practitioners.
Commentators have compared the struggle against corporate inver-
sions to a game of "whack-a-mole," in which planners devise new in-
version strategies that the government hen shuts down.108 This cycle
of private innovation and public response began in 1983, repeated in
1994 and 2002, and began again in 2014.109 The evolution of corporate
inversions reflects an ongoing policy debate over the line between per-
missible and impermissible cross-border transactions-a line that
practitioners have shaped through their legal interpretations. In each
cycle, the government response prohibited specific transactional tech-
niques, and, by doing so, clarified the scope of permissible cross-bor-
der transactions.)10 For example, legislation in 2004 required certain
inverting corporations to have a "substantial business presence" in
108 See, e.g., Bret Wells, Corporate Inversions and Whack-a-Mole Tax Policy, 143 Tax
Notes 1429 (June 23, 2014).
109 See Hicks, note 43. For regulatory responses to the current cycle of inversions, see
Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 C.B 712; Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 C.B. 775. See also note 132
(discussing proposed regulations under § 385); see generally Donald J. Marples & Jane G.
Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R43568, Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers:
Tax Issues 5-12 (Apr. 27, 2016), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43568.pdf.
110 Another consequence of these efforts is that the international reorganization rules
contain a significant body of over-inclusive and under-inclusive provisions that target
inversions.
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their new jurisdiction.11' Practitioners advocated for a quantitative
safe harbor with respect to this standard, which Treasury granted in
2006.112 Private-sector gamesmanship caused Treasury to eliminate
this safe harbor in 2009113 and reinstate a more stringent safe harbor
in 2012.114 Inversions are a policy concept rather than a technical le-
gal concept, and public and private actors held (and continue to hold)
diverse views on which transactions should be permissible. The deep
disagreements over inversion policy allowed (and continues to allow)
private interpretations to carry more weight in the policymaking pro-
cess, even in a politically charged environment.
Unsettled policy that divides private practitioners and regulators
also can result in planning drift. In 1994, Treasury proposed and final-
ized broad anti-abuse regulations that applied to partnerships, known
as the partnership anti-abuse rule.1 15 Treasury historically has used
targeted anti-abuse rules to backstop specific provisions in the Code
and regulations, but the partnership anti-abuse rule applied to the en-
tire partnership tax regime-all of subchapter K. Furthermore, the
partnership anti-abuse rule required consistency with "the intent of
subchapter K," as outlined in the regulations.116 Although practition-
ers criticized the partnership anti-abuse rule on several grounds, one
objection was that subchapter K lacked a singular theoretical basis
that could be construed as intent. Instead, the partnership tax rules
embodied compromises among the view of partnerships as distinct en-
tities, the view of partnerships as aggregates of their partners, and ad-
ministrative considerations. After promulgation, the partnership anti-
abuse rule remained controversial, and Treasury rarely deployed the
rule in publicly available analysis.'1 7 Although the partnership anti-
abuse rule likely deterred some transactions, practitioners interpreted
the rule generously to permit practice to continue virtually as it had
before promulgation.1 18 To the extent that the partnership anti-abuse
111 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § ?801(a), 118 Stat. 1418,
1562-66.
112 See T.D. 9265, 2006-2 C.B. 1.
113 See T.D. 9453, 2009-2 C.B. 114.
114 Treasury issued all of these rules as temporary regulations; the 2012 safe harbor was
finalized in 2015. See T.D. 9720, 2015-25 C.B. 1070 (finalizing Reg. § 1.7874-3); see also
Wells, note 108.
115 Reg. § 1.701-2; T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 109.
116 See Reg. § 1.701-2(a).
117 See Cunningham & Repetti, note 20, at 34.
118 See James B. Sowell, The Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules: Where Have We Been and
Where Are We Going?, 89 Taxes 69, 75 (2011). Although the partnership anti-abuse rule
rarely appears in published guidance or Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) materials,
the rule may affect taxpayers' behavior in more subtle ways. IRS agents may threaten to
apply the rule on audit to encourage taxpayer cooperation, even if the IRS would not
formally assert the rule in a formal assessment or court proceeding. This strategy is un-
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rule is consistent with the legislature's policy preferences, Treasury's
failure to correct any favorable practitioner interpretations resulted in
planning drift.
Sometimes, the legislature enacts policy that both private practi-
tioners and regulators find unsettled. In 2004, Congress enacted rules
under § 704(c)(1)(C) that attempted to prevent the inappropriate du-
plication or shifting of built-in losses on the contribution of property
to a partnership.119 These rules could produce inconsistent outcomes
under relatively common fact patterns.120 Furthermore, other part-
nership tax rules, also enacted in 2004, eliminated the benefits of cer-
tain abusive loss-duplication transactions through other means.121 At
the time, it was not clear how § 704(c)(1)(C) fit into this larger
scheme. Although neither Treasury nor private practitioners objected
to the general idea that certain partnership transactions involving
losses should not occur, the precise policy at stake in § 704(c)(1)(C)
remained unsettled. Congress explicitly authorized Treasury to issue
clarifying regulations to integrate § 704(c)(1)(C) into the partnership
tax rules,122 but, after years of promising guidance, Treasury did not
issue proposed regulations until 2014.123 During the interim period,
practitioners implemented § 704(c)(1)(C) in a variety of ways that in-
fluenced and affected Treasury's proposed interpretations. Treasury's
difficulty in implementing the policy concepts of the 2004 legislation,
as well as practitioners' skepticism about the provision, facilitated
planning drift.
Finally, the legislature's policy preferences may align with those of
Treasury and private practitioners. For example, in 1986, Congress
enacted the § 469 anti-tax shelter rules that effectively settled a policy
debate and produced only limited planning drift. By segregating sus-
pect tax losses from other types of income, § 469 targeted a wave of
likely to be used because, under internal Treasury directives, national-level approval is
required for field agents to invoke the rule. See Cunningham & Repetti, note 20, at 28,
33-34. Alternatively, practitioners may invoke the rule to cast doubts on transactional
structures or legal interpretations proposed by rivals, as a way of protecting their authority
with clients or the tax policy community. Cf. Bankman, note 98, at 1783-84 (describing the
ways in which outside counsel serves as a "brake" on tax shelter transactions). Finally, the
anti-abuse rule may constrain the behavior of in-house tax lawyers, who may be more risk-
averse than their large firm counterparts. See Sowell, supra, at 76.
119 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §? 833(a), 118 Stat. 1418,
1589 (enacting IRC § 704(c)(1)(C)).
120 William S. McKee, William F. Nelson, Robert L. Whitmire, Gary R. Huffman &
James P. Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships & Partners I 11.04[1][b] (3d ed,
2005).
121 See, e.g., IRC § 704(C)(1)(B).
122 IRC § 704(c)(1)(C)(ii).
123 See Prop. Reg. § 1.704-3(f). Interim guidance in 2005 did not address many integra-
tion issues involving § 704(c)(1)(C). See Notice 2005-32, 2005-1 C.B. 895.
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personal tax shelters that began in the 1970's and peaked in the mid-
1980's.124 At the time of enactment, some practitioners speculated
that § 469 would prove porous and that individual tax sheltering
would continue.125 Instead, the individual tax shelter wave virtually
ended after 1986.126 Although practitioners criticized aspects of
§ 469,127 the provision remained largely immune from private inter-
pretations that diverged from the enacting legislature's policy prefer-
ences.128 As a clear statement that certain types of personal tax
shelters needed to end, the 1986 tax reforms effectively dampened any
policy drift with respect to the provisions.
III. HARMS AND BENEFITS OF PLANNING DRIFT
This Part considers the potential harms and benefits of planning
drift. The effects of planning drift depend on the circumstances in
which it occurs, as well as the ways in which it interacts with bureau-
cratic drift and legislative drift. In isolation, planning drift results in
deviations from the legislature's preferred policy, imposes transaction
costs, and has potentially adverse distributional effects. Nevertheless,
planning drift may represent the lesser of evils, after taking into ac-
count other types of policy drift and the public costs of implementing
policy.
124 See Yin, note 80, at 214, 218-19 ("[T]he consensus is that the passive activity loss
rules have been a major factor, if not the single most critical factor, in the curbing of tax
shelter activity [since 1986]."). But see Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go
Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 499, 558-59 (1989) ("Congress may not have already won the battle
against abusive shelters at the time of section 469's enactment, but it was far too early to
say that existing weapons against abusive shelters had been fully tried and that they had
failed.").
125 For example, Lee Sheppard cites Richard Lipton, a prominent Chicago practitioner,
as arguing that tax sheltering would continue using "paired" gain and loss investments.
Lee A. Sheppard, Beating the Passive Loss Limitations, 32 Tax Notes 733, 733-34 (Aug. 25,
1986). Lipton also predicted that REITs would go "the way of the dinosaur" because of
the use of real estate in tax shelters. This prediction proved incorrect, and the increase in
REIT investment in the early 1990's gives indirect evidence of the effectiveness of the anti-
tax shelter provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Carnivale et al., note 34.
126 See Calvin H. Johnson, Why Have Anti-Tax Shelter Legislation? A Response to
Professor Zelenak, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 591, 625 (1989) ("The passive loss limitations have been
successful beyond any reasonable expectation."); Yin, note 80, at 218-19.
127 See, e.g., A. Timothy Scott, Public Comments on Regulations: L.A. County Bar
Members Criticize Complexity of Passive Loss Rules (Aug. 31, 1989), 89 TNT 183-25, Sept.
7, 1989, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
128 One possible exception may be the more technical aspects of the regulations, such as
the grouping rules in Reg. § 1.469-4.
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A. Fidelity to Legislative Preferences
The policy drift literature generally takes the perspective of the en-
acting legislature, asking how the enacting legislature acts to constrain
bureaucratic drift on the one hand and legislative drift on the other.129
Ordinarily, the legislature must trade a reduction in bureaucratic drift
for increased legislative drift and vice versa.130 Like bureaucratic drift
and legislative drift, planning drift moves public policy away from the
enacting legislature's preferences. The overall effects of planning
drift, however, must be considered in the broader context of subse-
quent agency rulemaking and the legislature's underlying motivations
for enacting legislation.
When evaluating planning drift, the aggregate effects of all types of
policy drift, including planning drift, must be considered. If the enact-
ing legislature seeks to minimize the aggregate long-term conse-
quences of policy drift, it may be indifferent about the precise path to
this result. The enacting legislature may welcome planning drift that
counters the effects of bureaucratic drift and legislative drift, and the
enacting legislature may resist planning drift that amplifies the effects
of other types of policy drift. A coalitional model of government deci-
sionmaking adds further texture to these legislative preferences. Dif-
ferent legislative factions, with different bargaining power, may prefer
different combinations of planning drift, legislative drift, and bureau-
cratic drift. 131 Information constraints also complicate a simple view
of legislative preferences. If the legislature cannot accurately or cost-
effectively predict private practitioners' policy preferences and plan-
ning opportunities, both at enactment and over time, the legislature
may not know when to allow planning drift. For these reasons, a risk-
averse legislature may prefer to limit planning drift.
Planning drift also can function as an affirmative tool for legisla-
tures to encourage prompt agency action. Bureaucratic drift occurs
129 Implicit in this approach is that the legislature's policy preferences are valuable, ei-
ther because they reflect broader democratic preferences or because they result from a
political process that itself is legitimizing. From this perspective, legislative drift harms the
enacting legislature but may not result in social harm. By contrast, planning drift may
result in social harm to the extent it affects subsequent agency rulemaking or legislation.
130 See note 60. Techniques such as agency design may constrain both bureaucratic drift
and legislative drift. Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of
Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 93, 108 (1992).
131 See DeShazo & Freeman, note 26, at 1517; Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation,
74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 247 (2007). These effects are similar to those observed by scholars
studying delegations of authority to multiple agencies and the choice between agency im-
plementation and judicial enforcement by private rights of action. See Anne Joseph
O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies
in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1655, 1704 (2006) (multiple agencies); Engstrom,
note 16, at 638 n.72 (private enforcement); see also Stephenson, note 26 (choice between
courts and agencies in the context of temporal versus cross-issue stability).
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
2016]
TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:
not only when agencies make rules, but also when agencies shirk by
delaying or failing to issue guidance.132 If the legislature cannot dis-
tinguish shirking from real effort at a time-consuming task, planning
drift may force an agency's hand by shaming the agency into action.
An agency also may feel compelled to intervene if private practition-
ers are construing legislation in a manner blatantly inconsistent with
the enacting legislature's preferences.133 Agencies, however, may not
always respond to divergent private interpretations. For example,
agencies' policy preferences may align with those of private practition-
ers (and not with those of the legislature), eliminating agencies' incen-
tives to intervene. Certain regulatory projects may be difficult or
time-consuming, and the additional pressure of planning drift may en-
courage hasty rulemaking or distort the final policy when the agency
issues regulations.134 In these ways, planning drift can lead to agency
132 In taxation, for example, in 1969 Congress directed Treasury to enact regulations
distinguishing debt from equity in the corporate context. See IRC § 385. After more than
a decade of study, Treasury issued final debt-equity regulations in January 1981, with a
delayed effective date. See T.D. 7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141. Practitioners excoriated these reg-
ulations. See, e.g., Treasury Tax Correspondence: Attorneys Comment on Debt-Equity
Regulations, 13 Tax Notes 284 (Aug. 3,1981). Furthermore, Treasury extended their effec-
tive date three times in 1981 and 1982, then withdrew them in 1983. See T.D. 7774, 1981-1
C.B. 1968; T.D. 7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60; T.D. 7822, 1982-2 C.B. 84; T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69.
The regulations never took effect, and Treasury effectively tabled the project. See Gergen
& Schmitz, note 6, at 161 & n.164.
In 2016, Treasury proposed regulations under § 385 that targeted "earnings stripping"
within multinational corporate groups by limiting related-party debt following acquisitions
and reorganizations that constitute corporate inversions, allowing the IRS to treat instru-
ments as part-equity and part-debt, and increasing information reporting requirements for
related-party instruments. See Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or
Indebtedness, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,911 (Apr. 8, 2016). The targeted nature of these proposed
regulations implicates bureaucratic drift, since Congress' initial grant of regulatory author-
ity occurred before inversions were politically salient. In addition, these proposed regula-
tions illustrate the power of policy communities to circulate ideas and build consensus. For
example, Treasury officials acknowledged Stephen Shay's influence on their choice to draw
on § 385's regulatory authority to combat inversions, stating that "the academic community
[and] the tax policy community ... help inform our [Treasury's] judgments" about policy
See Andrew Verlarde, Treasury Moves on Earnings Stripping, 151 Tax Notes 150 (Apr. 11,
2016). Not surprisingly, practitioners dispute the appropriateness of Treasury's proposed
regulations, and this debate has yet to be resolved. See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Little Dia-
logue, Much Vetting at Debt-Equity Reg Hearing, 152 Tax Notes 321 (July 18, 2016) ("At
no point in the legislative history does Congress give to or suggested it's giving to Treasury
the authority to make per se rules that automatically recast debt as equity simply because
Treasury doesn't like a particular type of transaction.") (quoting Joseph B. Judkins); Amy
S. Elliott & Lee A. Sheppard, D.C. and New York Bars Submit Comments on Debt-Equity
Regs, 152 Tax Notes 25 (July 4, 2016) (the D.C. Bar's position is that "'there is no evi-
dence' that Congress intended for section 385 to be used as a tool to achieve Treasury's
stated motivation for the rules"). See generally text accompanying notes 109-14 (discuss-
ing inversions).
133 See Stephenson, note 17, at 110.
134 See Gersen & O'Connell, note 17.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
TAX PLANNING AND POLICY DRIFT
action that supports legislative policy preferences, but this positive
role for planning drift is not without risks for the legislature.
The foregoing analysis assumes that the enacting legislature's policy
preferences have independent normative value.135 From a public
choice perspective, however, legislation is "bought" by interest groups
and "sold" by coalitions of legislators.136 Planning drift affects the ec-
onomic deal between these interest groups and legislators. If the
"purchased" legislation targets the "buying" interest group (or the
lawyers for the targets are themselves the interest group), then plan-
ning drift may be desirable for both legislators and interest groups.
For example, assume that special interests successfully lobby the legis-
lature for a statute that embodies Policy A. Both sides recognize that
the relevant agency will interpret the statute to implement Policy B,
which would result in bureaucratic drift inconsistent with the original
deal. The legislature could attempt to preserve the original deal by
requiring the relevant agency to include certain special interests in the
rulemaking process, allowing the special interests to influence any bu-
reaucratic drift that occurs. This strategy may be ineffective or risky
for legislators and special interests, depending on political and institu-
tional constraints, as well as existing agency attitudes and prefer-
ences.137 Planning drift offers an alternative: Special interests can
devote resources to creating private interpretations of the statute and
building consensus within the relevant policy community, rather than
lobbying the agency directly. To the extent these private interpreta-
tions affect agency rulemaking, planning drift allows these interests to
indirectly influence policy development in situations when lobbying is
difficult because of negative press, access, or institutional constraints.
In this way, planning drift may represent a tool to facilitate deals be-
tween the legislature and interest groups.
In order for this tool to work, planning drift must be accurately
priced into the original explicit or implicit arrangement between the
legislature and special interests. That is, the legislature must adjust
the statute's content to ensure that the post-drift policy reflects the
hypothetical arrangement with special interests in the absence of plan-
ning drift. In practice, this adjustment may be difficult. In order for
pricing to work, the legislature must anticipate the speed and magni-
135 For example, the legislature's policy preferences may reflect the broader public inter-
est. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1
(1990).
136 See id. at 64-65.
137 See Horn & Shepsie, note 18, at 504 n.9 (noting that "private interests represented in
the enacting coalition [often have] certain participatory rights and advantages in the pro-
cess of administrative implementation").
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tude of planning drift at the time it enacts a statute. If planning drift
has a larger effect than anticipated, the legislature will have demanded
too little from the special interests. If planning drift is more restrained
than expected, then the special interests will have "paid" too much.
Because special interests likely have better information about poten-
tial private legal interpretations than the legislature, undercharging by
the legislature is more likely than overcharging of special interests.
Similar problems emerge if both the legislature and special interests
agree on the amount of expected planning drift, but the variance in
potential outcomes is significant. Depending on the risk tolerances of
public and private actors, high variance planning drift may distort the
legislative deal. If the effects of planning drift are uncertain, or if pri-
vate parties systematically have better information about planning
drift than legislators, the price of the legislation will be wrong.
Finally, the legislature may enact statutes as symbolic gestures to
constituents or to enhance legislators' power and prestige.138 If plan-
ning drift works to restore the pre-enactment status quo, legislators
may prefer planning drift to the real policy costs of implementing a
purely symbolic statute. In particular, the legislature may prefer plan-
ning drift if the applicable agency takes the (purely symbolic) legisla-
tive mandate seriously and the legislature has no alternative methods
of precluding agency interpretation. To the extent planning drift is
unpredictable, erratic, or variable over time, this strategy is risky.
Furthermore, ex ante information about planning drift may be costly,
difficult to acquire, or unreliable. For these reasons, the enacting leg-
islature may not know whether planning drift will be beneficial or
harmful from its perspective, and a risk-averse legislature may choose
to limit or control planning drift. 139
B. Planning Costs and Rulemaking Costs
Planning drift generates transaction costs, both the private costs of
creating legal interpretations and the public costs incurred by govern-
ment actors in evaluating and responding to these legal interpreta-
tions.140 The private costs of planning drift-the costs of creating
private legal interpretations-fall into two categories. To the extent
that planning costs stem from interstitial interpretations, they may
simply reflect the costs of implementing policy-similar to the costs to
the government of writing, implementing, and enforcing positive law.
These costs may be acceptable, depending on the social benefits of the
138 See Shaviro, note 135, at 8-9, 81-82.
139 See Part IV.
140 See Gergen & Schmitz, note 6, at 174 (discussing the "the private effort in creating
[private-sector innovations] and the public effort in responding to them").
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underlying public policy after taking into account these interstitial in-
terpretations.141 By contrast, reconstructive interpretations implicate
more than just costs to implement policy. Although reconstructive in-
terpretations always result in net private gains, they may result in an
overall social loss to the extent they are costly to produce and incon-
sistent with public policy.142 These transaction costs compound if pri-
vate parties expend additional effort in avoiding governmental
attempts to correct or redirect planning drift.1 43
Costs that relate to interstitial interpretation may be acceptable
under several different scenarios. The key trade-off is the choice be-
tween government implementation and private implementation. Pri-
vate practitioners' interstitial interpretations may cost less than
comparable public action, especially if government actors have
trouble predicting which legal issues require additional guidance. If
private implementation is less expensive than comparable government
implementation, private interpretation-and some attendant policy
drift-may be preferred. This strategy, however, risks private intersti-
tial interpretations that are lower quality than the corresponding pub-
lic interpretations, either systematically or in specific circumstances.
Allowing private practitioners to develop legal interpretations may
confer other advantages beyond a reduction in costs. Existing private
enforcement regimes rely on private actors to initiate actions to en-
force public policy through agency or court adjudication.1 44 Scholars
argue that private enforcement encourages "legal innovation" by de-
veloping "novel legal theories, creative approaches to dispute settle-
ment, or new techniques of investigation and proof.'1 45 Planning drift
also can serve as a "policy laboratory" in which agencies pick and
choose among private interpretations after seeing those interpreta-
141 See Weisbach, note 11, at 224 ("[T]ax lawyers acting as return preparers help inter-
pret the law and ensure compliance, and these functions are socially valuable.").
142 See, id. at 222-25. But see Schler, note 38, at 385-87 (arguing, in effect, that certain
reconstructive interpretations are "intended" by Congress and so such planning does not
result in a social loss).
143 See Yin, note 80, at 216-17. This analysis assumes that legislative policy is beneficial.
The efficiency analysis is more nuanced if legislation can be socially detrimental. Daniel N.
Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic & Political Analysis of Transition Relief and
Retroactivity 64-66 (2000).
144 See Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in
the United States 3-4 (2010).
145 Stephenson, note 17, at 112-13 (noting that private suits produced several landmark
antitrust decisions after the early 1980's). These innovations also may directly interfere
with agency policymaking by, for example, "set[ting] the enforcement agenda" though the
types of actions filed and "skew[ing] agency enforcement priorities" to the extent the
agency must pursue remedial action. Id. at 118; see also Engstrom, note 16, at 638 ("Re-
lentless pursuit of profit thus yields a form of statutory drift and mission creep as private
enforcers drive law enforcement efforts in new and democratically unaccountable
directions.").
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tions put into practice. In addition, planning drift may develop agency
expertise by eliciting information and augmenting administrative en-
gagement with the underlying policy issues. The private sector, by de-
veloping legal interpretations with respect to a statute, can generate
expertise that the agency otherwise would have to develop on its own.
If private practitioners collect this information and develop these in-
terpretations more cheaply than regulators, the overall costs of public
policy may fall.
The effects of planning drift on agency rulemaking also depend on
the relationship between private practitioners' policy preferences and
those of the relevant agency. If practitioners' policy preferences align
with regulators' preferences (perhaps because of shared values within
a policy community), it may be less costly for agencies to permit some
degree of planning drift than to implement their preferred regulations
wholesale.146 This difference in costs can result from external pres-
sure by other interest groups or adverse legislators, or from internal
pressure by factions within an agency. Because private legal interpre-
tations can decrease the costs of certain regulatory options, planning
drift can facilitate agency rulemaking or help one faction within an
agency promulgate its preferred policy. If planners' policy prefer-
ences do not align with regulators' preferences, however, planning
drift may increase the costs of rulemaking, both the cost to design and
implement rules reversing the drift and the cost of forgoing the
agency's preferred policy. Furthermore, the relationship between
practitioner and agency preferences may evolve during the period be-
tween legislation and rulemaking, possibly through changes in the rel-
evant policy community. Although the ties between private
practitioners and agencies may give some sense as to how this analysis
plays out, the net costs or benefits of planning drift depend on a de-
tailed analysis of the relevant policy community and rulemaking
environment.
C. Distributional Considerations
As a process, planning drift allows certain private actors to achieve
benefits that are inconsistent with public policy from the perspective
of the enacting legislature. These benefits mean that planning drift
has distributional consequences-it affects who has what in society.
The beneficiaries of planning drift have the means, opportunity, and
inclination to engage experts to render legal advice; those who do not
146 Similarly, if a statute is socially detrimental (or has a "wart"), then planning drift that
obviates the statute or removes its warts may be socially beneficial. See Weisbach, note 11,
at 225 (describing this strategy as "a dangerous path").
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engage such experts suffer, in a relative sense. If the enacting legisla-
ture passes laws that reflect social consensus about distributive justice,
then planning drift disturbs this consensus and has harmful effects.
Social consensus, however, is elusive for issues of distribution, and the
legislature may represent an imperfect vehicle for advancing any con-
sensus that does exist.147 Furthermore, policymakers may be limited
in their ability to gather information needed to identify planning
drift's beneficiaries and determine the extent of their benefits. For
these reasons, a rational legislature may adopt a general presumption
against adjusting other tax or regulatory instruments to compensate
for planning drift's distributional effects.
On a more basic level, planning drift may contravene norms of
progressivity, in that the beneficiaries of planning drift may have sub-
stantial economic income and ability to contribute (or forgo) re-
sources to support government activities. Planning drift relies on
policy communities composed of experts that typically serve elite indi-
viduals and large businesses.148 Furthermore, planning drift is facili-
tated by legislation that targets sophisticated persons.149 These factors
indicate that planning drift operates to reduce the overall progressiv-
ity of the tax and transfer system, and this intuitive approach to
progressivity implies that the legislature should enact relatively higher
statutory marginal tax rates for high earners and the wealthy in order
to maintain appropriate effective marginal tax rates in the face of tax-
base eroding planning drift.
Such an approach to progressivity, however, is complicated by un-
certainties about tax incidence and the shifting of tax burdens. For
corporate-level taxes, economists' estimates of incidence vary signifi-
cantly under both general equilibrium models and quantitative empir-
ical approaches, but there is general agreement that labor bears at
least some portion of entity-level taxes.1 50 If corporations benefit
from planning drift in a nominal sense (and it seems very likely that
they do), then planning drift's implications for progressivity depend
on the specific proportion in which labor and capital bear corporate
taxes. After taking into account the uncertainties associated with tax
147 See Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice ch. 2
(2002) (critiquing traditional metrics of distributional justice).
148 See Subsection II.A.2.
149 See Subsection II.B.2.
150 See William M. Gentry, A Review of the Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporate
Income Tax 4-6 (U.S. Treas. Dep't Office of Tax Analysis, Paper 101, 2007), http://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/otal 01.pdf (analyzing em-
pirical approaches); Jennifer Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of General Equi-
librium Estimates and Analysis, 66 Nat'l Tax J. 185, 204-05, 211 (2013) (discussing various
models). For a general overview, see Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax
61-62, 67-70 (2009).
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incidence, it seems reasonable for policymakers to table remedies for
planning drift's distributional effects, absent specific and compelling
information as to what these effects are.
IV. MANAGING PLANNING DRIFT
From the enacting legislature's perspective, planning drift can have
positive or negative effects, depending on its interaction with other
types of policy drift and the preferences of the enacting legislature,
either in the aggregate or with respect to specific factions. The enact-
ing legislature may not object to planning drift if it mitigates the con-
sequences of bureaucratic drift and legislative drift. Planning drift,
however, may be unpredictable, erratic, or variable over time, and ex
ante information about planning drift may be costly, difficult to ac-
quire, or unreliable.15 1 For these reasons, a risk-averse or poorly in-
formed legislature may want to limit or control planning drift.1
5 2
Without taking a position on the normative value of the enacting leg-
islature's policy preferences, this Part discusses techniques that the en-
acting legislature could use to manage planning drift. The first two
strategies are more general: legislate elsewhere and build consensus
with planners. Then, this Part considers several specific structural
techniques that may limit planning drift.
A. Legislate Elsewhere
The agents of planning drift are private practitioners engaged in
policy communities. Because policy communities are specialized, the
legislature can manage planning drift by implementing a given policy
through different areas of law.153 If the legislature's preferred statute
implicates an area of law associated with a strong, adverse policy com-
munity, the legislature may choose to enact the same substantive pol-
icy in an area of law where planning drift is less likely. One example
of this choice involves tax expenditures, which are tax laws designed
to implement social policy rather than raise revenue. The legislature
could manage planning drift with respect to tax law by replacing tax
expenditures with equivalent spending provisions. For example, the
legislature enacts faster-than-economic depreciation to encourage
151 See Subsection II.C.1.
152 See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, note 17, at 437 ("If legislators are risk
averse, unpredictability in the nature of agency noncompliance will be regarded by all as
undesirable."); Stephenson, note 26, at 1045 ("Legislators may care not only about the
expected values of the policy lotteries represented by the delegation to agencies and dele-
gation to courts, but also about the variance of those lotteries.").
153 Similarly, the legislature can manage bureaucratic drift by delegating to sympathetic
agencies. See, e.g., Macey, note 130, at 108-09.
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capital investment, and these depreciation rules may enable tax plan-
ning techniques that lead to planning drift. 154 Direct incentives for
capital formation (with appropriate recapture provisions) could ac-
complish the same policy objective but avoid engaging the tax policy
community. Another example is the use of tax increases to regulate
taxpayer behavior.155 Starting in the 1980's, lawmakers used the Code
to regulate executive compensation with the goal of improving corpo-
rate governance.1 56 These Code-based restrictions proved largely in-
effective, in part because private practitioners developed legal
strategies that preserved executives' pay within the framework of the
new laws. For this reason, commentators suggest moving the regula-
tion of executive compensation out of the Code.1 57 These two exam-
ples illustrate the potential costs of legislating in an area of law in
which planning drift is common.
There are potential disadvantages to legislating elsewhere, however.
Legislating elsewhere may lead to suboptimal policy, and these costs
may outweigh the benefits of avoiding planning drift. That is, the leg-
islature may have good reasons for choosing to legislate in areas of
law where planning drift is likely. Existing legal rules, agency exper-
tise, and institutional structures may make one area of law preferable
to others, and shifting to the second-best statute may be costly in
terms of administration and politics, as well as policy. Tax expendi-
tures, for example, may have administrative or participatory advan-
tages over corresponding spending programs, and, in some situations,
redundant tax and spending programs may ameliorate principal-agent
154 For example, one strategy involves a taxpayer that holds property, then transfers that
property to a tax-exempt business entity, such as a REIT, in a transaction that does not
trigger gain (or that triggers gain at a reduced rate, such as with certain real property, or
only at the shareholder level for assets held in corporate solution). See Russell J. Singer,
Understanding REITs, UPREITS and DOWN-REITS and the Tax and Business Decisions
Surrounding Them, 16 Va. Tax Rev. 329 (1996), for an explanation of the strategy involving
REITS. The taxpayer can offset income using the faster-than-economic depreciation de-
ductions without sacrificing comparable economic value on the transfer to the tax-exempt
entity. The tax-exempt entity can either use the property or sell the property, subject to
limitations imposed by provisions such as § 1374. Essentially, this strategy divides the eco-
nomic and tax benefits of the property unequally between the taxpayer and the tax-exempt
entity, with a disproportionate share of the tax benefits going to the taxpayer. Neither
Congress nor Treasury has directly responded to this strategy.
155 These situations arise both with respect to Pigouvian taxes, which eliminate external-
ities through price adjustments rather than direct regulation, and revenue-raising provi-
sions that advance other policy aims.
156 See IRC § 280G (parachute payments), § 4999 (parachute payments), § 162(m) (cap
on nonperformance-based pay), § 409A (deferred compensation), and § 457A (deferred
compensation).
157 See, e.g., Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing
Executive Compensation, 17 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 383, 420-27 (2008).
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concerns between the legislature and administrative agencies.158 The
legislature also may choose an area of law for political economy rea-
sons.159 Politicians may enact tax provisions because parallel spending
provisions are aesthetically or ideologically unpalatable to their con-
stituents or party.160 Furthermore, legislating elsewhere may be im-
possible for reforms that relate to a specific area of law, such as anti-
abuse or loophole-closing provisions. Indeed, the benefits of legislat-
ing elsewhere may be overwhelmed by the costs of transitioning be-
tween areas of law. For example, commentators argue that the
corporate-level income tax should be removed and replaced with
changes to the individual income tax rate structure, but existing inte-
gration proposals, which would eliminate the current corporate tax,
could open new avenues for tax planning through both their structure
and on the transition to the new regime.161 Finally, planning drift is
dynamic, not static, and legislating elsewhere may cause a shift in
planning resources to that new area of law.1
62
B. Build Consensus with Planners
For more than twenty years, legal scholars have promoted respon-
sive regulation as a means to encourage compliance by regulated par-
ties. Responsive regulation refers to a "bottom-up" approach to
regulation in which lawmakers use persuasion and participation, as
well as punishment, to foster compliance.163 Lawmakers could deploy
these techniques during the legislative process, as well as after enact-
ment, to constrain planning drift before or as it develops. One risk to
158 See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Pro-
grams, 113 Yale L.J. 955, 957-59 (2004); David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principal-
Agent Problems, and Redundancy, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1823, 1825-27 (2006).
159 See Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending Programs, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1197,
1214-22 (2006).
160 Federal welfare programs, for example, may be easier to enact through the tax sys-
tem than as direct spending. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 537-40 (1995).
161 See Shaviro, note 150, at 154-58.
162 The relevant factor is the elasticity of private planning in the alternative area of law.
For example, professional specialization and the (strong) tax policy community makes
planning drift with respect to tax law relatively inelastic over time. Even if the legislature
reduces planning opportunities in tax law, existing tax lawyers may be unable to redirect
their efforts to other areas of law. As long as the pool of lawyers is relatively large, others
may be able to specialize in the alternative area of law.
163 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Der-
egulation Debate 3-5 (1992). Similarly, negotiated rulemaking, where an agency involves
private groups in the drafting of proposed regulations (rather than notice and comment),
"lower[s] the costs to poorly organized groups of including themselves in the day-to-day
implementation of complex legislation." Macey, note 130, at 103. For a critique of respon-
sive regulation in the tax context, see Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive Tax
Regulation, 66 Tax L. Rev. 121 (2012).
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this strategy is that practitioners may persuade lawmakers that their
views should prevail, in which case planning drift becomes integrated
into the formal political process, with practitioners and their clients as
an interest group.164 Viewed from the perspective of planning drift,
responsive regulation simply acknowledges the fact that legal under-
standings are co-produced by legislators, regulators, private sector ex-
perts, and regulated parties.
To a significant extent, Congress and Treasury historically have in-
volved (and continue to involve) tax practitioners in the legislative
process.165 For example, the 1954 recodification grew in part from an
ALI study in the early 1950's, and Congress incorporated certain ideas
from the study into the final legislation.166 More recently, the Install-
ment Sales Reform Act of 1980167 stemmed from discussions among
bar associations, the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants, various officials at Treasury and the IRS, and congressional staff-
ers, all spearheaded by noted practitioner and academic Martin
Ginsburg. The 1980 reform substantially unified the treatment of
transactions where payment is received in a later taxable year and
largely displaced prior theories of installment sales, some of which
were more favorable to taxpayers.168 Although private practitioners
developed planning techniques with respect to the new statute, they
did not press to maintain even more permissive regimes, such as the
open transaction doctrine, in which no amounts are taken into income
until the final payment is received.169 In this sense, the installment
sale rules enforced a compromise that granted taxpayers the benefits
of some deferral but not maximum deferral. Although these collabo-
rative efforts raise questions about whether the resulting laws favor
private interests, the legislature may prefer known concessions to pri-
vate experts over the vagaries of planning drift.
164 Indeed, rolling some component of planning drift into the lawmaking or rulemaking
process may be worse than simply allowing planning drift, since tax practitioners have het-
erogeneous preferences.
165 Other countries also have brought private experts into the drafting process for tax
legislation. See Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, Professionals' Contribution to the Legislative
Process: Between Self, Client, and the Public, 39 Law & Soc. Inquiry 96 (2014) (trust
reform in Israel).
166 See Lawrence Zelenak, The Almost-Restatement of Income Tax of 1954: When Tax
Giants Roamed the Earth, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 709, 717-23 (2014).
167 Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247, (1980).
168 See Robert R. Wootton, Taxation of the Seller in a Multi-Year Sale or Exchange, 81
Taxes 191 (2003). For the article that initiated this collaborative process, see Martin Gins-
burg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 Tax L. Rev. 469 (1975).
169 For example, some practitioners advise clients to report the disbursement of pay-
ments held in escrow after closing on the installment method, while other practitioners find
such treatment overly aggressive.
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Congress also could direct Treasury to build practitioner support
after legislation but in advance of rulemaking.170 At present, Treasury
often builds support informally for its preferred policies, but Congress
could mandate these efforts in connection with specific tax statutes.
For example, Treasury ordinarily issues a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and requests comments before finalizing regulations. On
occasion, however, Treasury has solicited comments from private
practitioners before drafting proposed regulations.171 Congress and
Treasury could go further. For example, in 2007, Donald Korb, then
IRS Chief Counsel, proposed giving tax practitioners the pen when
drafting certain types of regulations.17 2 Although the media derided
Korb's proposal as "the fox designing the henhouse,1' 73 legislators
could use Korb's general approach in crafting tax legislation. Not only
would this approach give government officials an opportunity to shape
policy views and build consensus within the tax policy community, this
approach also could give government officials better information on
future planning drift.
Building consensus has risks. As shown by the media's reaction to
Korb's proposal, the public may perceive that collaboration and con-
sensus-building give certain private parties an unfair advantage, even
if the purpose of the collaboration is to forestall planning drift. One
possible remedy is to make these collaborations public and transpar-
ent. For example, the tax media criticized three accounting firms and
the Institute of Chartered Accountants (Australia) for sponsoring a
closed symposium on base erosion and profit shifting hosted by the
Australian Treasury as part of its G20 presidency.74 Similarly, in the
1980's and early 1990's, commentators criticized government officials
for participating in closed retreats sponsored by NYU School of Law
and involving private practitioners and academics. These retreats,
which purportedly produced ideas that led to major changes in tax
170 See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, note 17, at 444; Horn & Shepsle, note
18, at 506-07. For example, Congress could "stack the deck" in favor of tax practitioners
as an organized interest group by mandating that Treasury convene and consult with a
committee of practitioners before promulgating rules.
171 See, e.g., Notice 2007-17, 2007-1 C.B. 748; Henry Ordower, First Drafts of Technical
Guidance: Industry Participation, 115 Tax Notes 761 (May 21, 2007).
172 See David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Letting Tax Lawyers Write Rules, N.Y. Times, Mar.
9, 2007, at C1.
173 Id. The IRS also has allowed practitioners to comment on proposed revenue rulings
before they are published, and the IRS sometimes receives draft revenue rulings from pri-
vate experts, including bar associations. For private letter rulings, taxpayers often submit
draft PLRs to the IRS, which comments on the draft. Other taxpayers can examine the
final PLRs, which practitioners treat as probative of IRS thinking.
174 See Kristen A. Parillo, Australia's "Secret" International Tax Symposium?, 143 Tax
Notes 867 (May 26, 2016).
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law, were controversial for their exclusivity and closed nature.175 Had
these conferences been more open, they might have attracted less crit-
icism. The trade-off is that practitioners may not be as forthcoming
about their interpretative predilections in a public or more open fo-
rum. For this reason, closed-door sessions may have value, and gov-
ernment actors must balance this benefit against the potential public
relations costs.
C. Structural Techniques
Congress also could use various structural techniques to limit plan-
ning drift. Specifically, congressional hearings and investigations,
temporary legislation, and statutory deadlines for regulations each
may constrain planning drift. Like the strategies discussed above,
these structural techniques have drawbacks, and their appeal also de-
pends on whether, on balance, planning drift is desirable or
undesirable.
1. Hearings and Investigations
Congressional hearings and investigations represent a long-standing
but often criticized method of controlling bureaucratic drift. Hearings
and investigations discipline agencies by serving a monitoring function
and producing information that informs subsequent legislative sanc-
tions, which can include reductions in an agency's budget or the im-
peachment or prosecution of individual administrators. In addition,
hearings and investigations can publicly chasten officials who testify,
which can damage their credibility or careers.176 Similarly, congres-
sional hearings and investigations can limit planning drift by eliciting
information about planning drift and calling private practitioners to
task for interpretations inconsistent with the legislature's preferred
policy. Although attorney-client privilege and community norms
about confidentiality generally protect specific private interpretations
from the public eye, these interpretations may become publicly known
through indirect means, such as public company disclosure and the
informal circulation of information within the relevant policy commu-
nity, or through the direct testimony of taxpayers or advisors such as
175 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Eagle Lodge 11: How I Taught the Treasury to Keep a
Secret, 46 Tax Notes 1065 (Feb. 26, 1990). But see Ljubomir Nacev, The Elitist Nature of
Tax Policymaking, 42 Tax Notes 1141 (Feb. 27, 1989).
176 See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, note 17, at 244, 248-49; see also
Jack M. Beerman, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61 (2006); Brian D.
Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences and Congressional Monitoring of
the Administrative State, 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 23 (2011).
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accountants.177 Just as hearings and investigations can rein in bureau-
crats, similar strategies can restrain private practitioners.
As a means to control agencies, hearings and investigations have
several deficiencies that also apply to planning drift. First, hearings
and investigations are costly, and these costs limit opportunities for
legislators to pursue other activities. Second, as a monitoring device,
hearings and investigations operate only after the fact. Any planning
drift that has occurred must be corrected, with the caveats to such
corrections discussed in this Article. 178 The fear of ex post sanctions
may encourage ex ante fidelity to legislative preferences, but, like reg-
ulators, rational private practitioners will discount any sanction by the
probability that Congress will investigate and find the undesirable ac-
tivity. Private practitioners may view hearings and investigations as
less threatening than regulators, since no explicit principal-agent rela-
tionship or lines of accountability exist between government and pri-
vate practitioners. Finally, to a significant extent, hearings and
investigations rely on the parties at issue to reveal their own bad be-
havior. Just as agencies have little reason to be forthcoming about
their infidelity to the enacting legislature's preferred policy, private
practitioners may be reticent to reveal planning drift.179 This disad-
vantage, however, can be mitigated by calling a variety of experts-
public, private, and academic-to testify.
In the tax context, hearings have been used to uncover planning
techniques and censure tax practitioners. As discussed in the § 382
case study in the Appendix, the 1958 and 1959 hearings on subchapter
C allowed members of Congress to question tax practitioners and
make public a critique of trafficking in NOL carryovers. Notably,
these hearings had little practical effect on tax planning with NOL
carryovers.18 0 More recently, Senator Carl Levin's Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations has held frequent hearings on purported
tax abuses, and these hearings have featured testimony from, and cri-
177 In tax, attorney-client privilege may have limited applicability (unless closely moni-
tored), if third-party accountants participate in tax-related discussions and receive copies
of tax-related memoranda nd other documents. See Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Note, Privi-
leged Communications with Accountants: The Demise of United States v. Kovel, 86 Marq.
L. Rev. 977 (2003) (discussing the limitations on privilege for accountant-client
communications).
178 See Subsection II.A.4. The problems with ex post corrections are why the policy
drift literature looks to ex ante limitations on bureaucratic drift. See McCubbins et al,
Structure and Process, note 17, at 440 ("[T]he most effective means for achieving policy
stability are constraints on the flexibility of agencies, rather than reliance on rewards, pun-
ishments, and oversight.").
179 See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, note 17, at 251. The existence of
policy communities may mitigate this concern, since some members may be forthcoming
about private interpretations that they know about but with which they disagree.
180 See Subsection III.A.5.
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tiques of, tax practitioners from accounting firms, law firms, and busi-
nesses.181 For example, in 2003, the accounting firm Ernst & Young
implemented "firm-wide changes" in response to negative publicity
from Levin's investigations into the firm's role in promoting corporate
tax shelters.182 This anecdotal evidence, along with empirical studies
on hearings' effectiveness in disciplining agencies, indicates that hear-
ings generally are a limited but plausible strategy for managing plan-
ning drift. 183
2. Temporary Legislation
One source of planning drift is legislative or regulatory inaction: If
private practitioners' interpretations go unchallenged, the result is de
facto policy change. Temporary legislation, defined as statutes that by
their terms expire (or sunset) after a fixed period of time, can function
as an agenda-control device to ensure that future legislatures revisit
policy issues.184 This type of reconsideration may push the legislature
to correct private interpretations of existing legislation, or to allow
such legislation to expire, which may obviate any planning drift in-
volving the statute.1 85 In this way, temporary legislation potentially
"restarts the clock" on private planning by facilitating ex post legisla-
tive review.18
6
This strategy requires several caveats. While temporary legislation
gives the enacting legislature agenda control over future legislatures,
the future legislature is not bound by the enacting legislature's pre-
ferred policy.187 If the legislature's composition or coalitional dynam-
ics change, then any remedial legislation may deviate from the
enacting legislature's policy preferences.188 Temporary legislation
trades a potential reduction in planning drift for a possible increase in
legislative drift. In addition, private actors may expect the legislature
181 See, e.g., Caterpillar's Offshore Tax Strategy: Hearing Before the Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Aff., 113th Cong.
(2014), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/cat
erpillars-offshore-tax-strategy.
182 See Rostain & Regan, note 94, at 346.
183 Compare McCubbins et. al., Administrative Procedures, note 17, at 249, with Beer-
man, note 176.
184 See Gersen, note 131, at 247.
185 Similarly, the agenda control function of temporary legislation can constrain bureau-
cratic drift at the risk of increased legislative drift. See id. at 282-83.
186 To the extent expiring temporary provisions crowd the legislature's agenda, the qual-
ity of legislative deliberation may decline, which may prevent a review that considers the
effects of private planning. See George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political
Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 174, 248-51 (2009).
187 See Gersen, note 131, at 281-82.
188 If the future legislature is democratically accountable, then this outcome may be de-
sirable. See Part V.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
2016]
TAX LAW REVIEW
to renew temporary legislation as-is or with limited revisions, and
these expectations may limit future legislatures' discretion with re-
spect to policy.189 Each year, for example, Congress renews the over-
whelming majority of the temporary tax incentives known as
"extenders." Although these renewals create some planning uncer-
tainty, they may not deter planning drift. 190 Finally, in certain areas of
law such as taxation, temporary legislation may encourage private
practitioners to develop and implement planning techniques more
quickly, accelerating the process of planning drift. If private practi-
tioners and their clients expect that subsequent legislation will be less
favorable and the benefits of current transactions will be
grandfathered, then these practitioners have an incentive to fully de-
velop private interpretations during the window of the temporary pro-
vision.191 For these reasons, temporary legislation may not always
represent an attractive strategy to manage planning drift.
3. Statutory Deadlines
Finally, the legislature can constrain planning drift by forcing agen-
cies to promulgate rules within a specific period after enactment.192
By reducing the time between enactment and rulemaking, the legisla-
ture limits opportunities for planning drift with respect to the stat-
ute.193 Outside of the tax context, the Dodd-Frank Act194 contained
hundreds of rulemaking requirements on agencies, approximately
three-fourths of which gave deadlines for final rules.'95 Statutory
deadlines can be viewed as limiting not only planning drift, but also
regulatory drift and legislative drift. The legislature can monitor
189 If, under a public choice approach, temporary legislation allows members of Con-
gress to extract additional rents from interest groups at each sunset date, the pre-existing
statute still may favor clean renewal over substantive renegotiation. See Rebecca M.
Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1051-52 (2011); see also Gersen, note
131, at 285 (arguing that temporary legislation may increase the overall social loss from
rent-seeking by encouraging more market participants); Yin, note 186, at 239-44 (arguing
that, for temporary legislation, reduced rent-seeking at enactment may offset increased
rent-seeking at renewal).
190 See Kysar, note 189, at 1016-17, 1043-44; see also Yin, note 186, at 246-48 (noting
that uncertainty depends on the expected, rather than the nominal, duration of legislation).
191 See Yin, note 186, at 244-46.
192 See O'Connell, note 44, at 977 ("Deadlines imposed at the time of delegation that
fall before a congressional transition do not create the same problem of legislative drift as
oversight hearings about an old statute in a new Congress."); see also Jacob E. Gersen &
Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 543 (2007).
193 See Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Adminis-
trative Process, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 689 (2013); Gersen & O'Connell, note 17.
194 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
195 Gersen, note 193, at 724-25. Many of these deadlines were not met.
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agency shirking and bureaucratic drift by setting a (reasonable) statu-
tory deadline. If this deadline falls before the next election cycle, then
final regulations will exist before a subsequent legislature can amend
the statute, limiting legislative drift.196 Since delays between enact-
ment and rulemaking generally facilitate planning drift, shorter statu-
tory deadlines can have the opposite effect.
Statutory deadlines have potential drawbacks. Producing high-
quality regulations requires time and resources, such as money and
personnel, and statutory deadlines operate as a hard cap on the time
available to an agency to craft regulations. This cap may force agen-
cies to allocate resources away from other projects, and the quality of
those other projects may suffer. In addition, time and resources may
not be substitutable factors in the production of regulations. For ex-
ample, certain activities may require a minimum amount of time (per-
haps to satisfy procedural requirements), or overall agency resources
may be strictly limited (as is the case at the Treasury). In this case, the
quality of the regulations subject to the deadline will decline. Further-
more, the remedy for missed deadlines often is unclear. Finally, pro-
cedural requirements, such as those under the APA, may impose a de
facto minimum time between statutory enactment and regulation.197
These caveats limit the utility of statutory deadlines as a constraint on
planning drift.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article introduces a new concept, planning drift, to explore the
ways in which private legal interpretations influence the development
of public policy. Planning drift contributes to scholarship on taxation
and administrative law, including the literature on policy drift, by em-
phasizing the role of private experts in producing lasting policy
change. In developing the concept of planning drift, this Article fre-
quently takes the enacting legislature's perspective, proposing strate-
gies that the enacting legislature can use to restrict planning drift.
Implicit in this approach is that the legislature's policy preferences
carry greater normative weight than the preferences of other partici-
pants in the lawmaking process. The legislature, for example, may re-
spond more readily to voters, and this responsiveness may have
196 Id. at 727.
197 Although courts have upheld exemptions from the notice and comment process for
regulations produced under statutory deadlines, these exemptions increase the likelihood
of bureaucratic drift and potentially affect the legislative deal under which the statute was
enacted. See Gersen & O'Connell, note 17, at 933.
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independent value in a majoritarian democracy.198 Relaxing these as-
sumptions complicates the role of planning drift in policymaking. If
government institutions do not respond readily to the electorate, or if
majoritarian policy preferences themselves are suspect, then planning
drift can act as a corrective to misguided legislative action.199 To the
extent that the norms of private experts and their policy communities
can be aligned with broader conceptions of social welfare, planning
drift can advance public policy goals, even in the face of breakdowns
or dysfunction in other aspects of the formal political process.
This Article discusses legislative strategies to limit planning drift
where it is not desired, but administrative agencies also may have an
interest in managing planning drift both before and after rulemaking.
If planning drift prevents agencies from implementing their preferred
policy, agencies have an incentive to constrain planning drift between
legislation and rulemaking. Agencies may want to prevent private
practitioners from interpreting newly promulgated rules in ways that
diverge from those agencies' policy preferences. On the other hand,
an agency may welcome planning drift if private practitioners' policy
preferences align with the agency's preferences, especially if the
agency faces high costs of rulemaking. Even if an agency's policy pref-
erences diverge from those of practitioners, the agency may benefit
from planning drift in situations where its jurisdiction either overlaps
that of a competing lawmaking body or fails to cover (that is, un-
derlaps) a substantive area that the agency would like to regulate.
200
This picture becomes complicated if agencies have heterogeneous
preferences and internal factions, and if policy communities include
both regulators and private practitioners. Questions of institutional
design and policymaking, whether focused on the legislature or ad-
ministrative agencies, should engage planning drift.
A central theme in this Article is the relationship between private
sector expertise and public policy change. In particular, the concept
of policy communities-an important factor in planning drift-chal-
lenges conventional divisions between public and private and between
state and society. In introducing the idea of planning drift and empha-
sizing the role of policy communities, this Article advocates for a more
198 See Stephenson, note 85, at 56-58 (describing this approach as "the conventional
view"); O'Connell, note 44, at 977-78 (arguing that, in some cases, Congress may be better
suited than the President to promote democratic accountability).
199 See Stephenson, note 85, at 57 & n.4, 82-83 (arguing that "majoritarian interests are
often best served not by maximizing the influence of an electorally accountable politician
but rather by ensuring a degree of bureaucratic insulation that makes political control of
agencies costly but not impossible"); see also Subsection II.C.3 (discussing corporate tax
incidence).
200 See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative
Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201 (2006).
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holistic approach to public policy development, one that opens addi-
tional normative opportunities for advancing policy aims. Just as
scholars argue that privatization of government functions can advance
the public good beyond efficiency gains, planning drift provides a pos-
sible means to further public policy goals by leveraging private practi-
tioners' interpretive norms as mediated by the relevant policy
community. In taxation, scholars have decried perceived changes in
the tax bar that have made corporate tax shelters and aggressive inter-
national tax planning acceptable as a matter of practice,201 but schol-
ars have spent less time exploring how and why practitioners justify
the positions they take. Self-interest has ome explanatory power, but
too little attention has been paid to professional and norm-based con-
straints on practitioners' legal positions. Planning drift suggests that
one route to curtailing overly aggressive tax planning involves work-
ing with the tax policy community to change norms. To do this, more
must be known about policy communities' structure and function. As
a concept, planning drift highlights how private legal interpretations
shape public policy and reinforces the idea that "implementation is
politics by other means.' 20 2 By focusing attention on the private ex-
perts who create these legal interpretations, this Article attempts to
expand our understanding of how public policy develops in the mod-
ern U.S. administrative state.
201 See Rostain & Regan, note 94.
202 See Eric M. Patashnik, Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Policy Changes
Are Enacted 5 (2008).




A CASE STUDY OF PLANNING DRIFT
This Appendix uses a qualitative, historical case study to show spe-
cific processes of planning drift over time. 203 Because planning drift
depends heavily on context-the area of law, the economic environ-
ment, the specific statute, and the relevant policy community-a case
study approach is well-suited to the study of planning drift. Not all
planning drift, however, follows the pathways outlined in this case
study. The case study method is not experimental; there is no control
group. For this reason, it is not possible to know the counterfactual
public policy desired by the enacting Congress or Treasury in the ab-
sence of private interpretation. In order to show deviations from con-
gressional and agency policy preferences, this Appendix carefully
traces changes in law and policy and interpolates motivation and in-
tentions from what people do and say.
This case study, drawn from taxation, explores planning drift
through government efforts in the 1950's and 1960's to limit the "traf-
ficking" in loss corporations, which are corporations with NOL carry-
overs available to offset positive income in the future. Specifically,
this case study describes the development of a market in NOL car-
ryforwards in the 1940's and early 1950's, then outlines legislative ef-
forts to restrict the market in NOL carryforwards that culminated in
the enactment of § 382 as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Private practitioners' interstitial and reconstructive interpretations in-
volving § 382 preserved a robust market in NOL carryovers. These
private interpretations reflected alternative policy understandings
with respect to when NOL carryovers could be transferred-the driv-
ing force of planning drift. This case study explores Congress and
Treasury's responses to the private interpretations that preserved the
transferability of NOL carryovers, as well as how those responses re-
flected planning drift.
204
203 Quantitative studies generally do not permit this type of analysis. Id. at 12 (arguing
that the use of case studies "permits a nuanced examination of the relationship between
distinct configurations of ideas, institutions, and interests on the one hand, and reform
outcomes on the other"); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Stories and Tax Histories: Is
There a Role for History in Shaping Tax Law?, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2227, 2234-35 (2002)
(book review).
204 For general (and roughly contemporaneous) overviews of the changing law of NOL
carryovers during this period, see Note, Net Operating Loss Carryovers and Corporate
Adjustments: Retaining an Advantageous Tax History Under Libson Shops and Sections
269, 381, and 382, 69 Yale L.J. 1201 (1960); James B. Loken, Loss Carryovers and Corpo-
rate Alterations: Toward a Uniform Approach, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 571 (1968). For an exam-
ple of how § 382 is perceived after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, see Calvin H. Johnson, The
Shelf Project: Revenue-Raising Projects that Defend the Tax Base, 117 Tax Notes 1077,
1077 (Dec. 10, 2007) (arguing that the 1986 version of § 382 "ended trafficking in net oper-
ating losses that had also gone on for decades"). See also Robert R. Wootton, Section 382
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In general, the U.S. tax system treats gains and losses asymmetri-
cally. For each annual accounting period, the Code imposes tax on
net profits but provides no compensation for net losses. If a corpora-
tion loses money during a taxable year, it is not entitled to a cash
payment of negative taxes solely because of that loss. As a form of
legislative grace, NOL carryovers mitigate this asymmetry by allowing
taxpayers to net gains and losses over a statutory period, presently
twenty-three years.205 During this statutory period, a corporate tax-
payer may change its business activities, shareholders, customers, or
employees, or another corporation may acquire it. These changes can
affect which specific stakeholders-shareholders, customers, suppli-
ers, or employees-ultimately bear the burden of the corporate in-
come tax. That is, the economic value of NOL carryovers can be
"transferred" if the carryovers survive a change in the corporation
that incurred the underlying losses. If economic consideration is paid
for these NOL carryovers in connection with a corporate change (for
example, if the tax benefit is capitalized into the corporation's share
price on a sale of stock), there is trafficking of the carryovers. Policy
judgments are required to determine whether a corporate change (in,
for example, ownership or business activities) should prevent a corpo-
ration from using some or all pre-change NOL carryforwards to re-
duce post-change tax liabilities.
Tax planning for NOL carryovers is distinguishable from tax shel-
tering-there is more than bare tax minimization at stake. Unlike
paradigmatic tax shelters, the underlying activities that generate NOL
carryforwards typically have ex ante, risk-adjusted social value, not-
withstanding the ex post negative economic outcome. People in busi-
ness do not invest to lose money.20 6 In addition, restrictions on the
transfer of NOL carryovers and free transferability each can be justi-
fied under legitimate but competing conceptions of the corporate tax
base.207 Not only was § 382 a political issue, but it also had stakes for
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 64 Taxes 874, 876 (1986) (claiming that, "[m]ore often
than not, the consolidated return regulations [rather than § 382] provided the binding limi-
tation" on the transfer of NOL carryovers before 1986).
205 See IRC § 172.
206 See Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full
Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 709, 733 (1981). Private practitioners have, of course,
developed techniques to generate artificial losses. During the 1950's, however, few raised
questions about the provenance of corporate NOLs and, based on case law and other
sources, most if not all corporate NOLs involving in trafficking reflected real business
losses.
207 See id. at 710-11 (proposing full refundability of operating losses); ALI, Federal In-
come Tax Project, Subchapter C 27-28 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1980); see also Jacob Nussim &
Avraham Tabbach, Tax-Loss Mechanisms, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1443 (2014).
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economic views of tax law.208 With regard to § 382, the private inter-
pretations that drove planning drift were not simply aggressive tax
planning but also were part of a larger policy conversation.
A. Making a Market in NOL Carryovers
In the early 1940's, newspapers and business publications began to
advertise the sale of corporate shells that contained only liquid assets
and NOL carryovers. In 1943, a New York Times classified ad ex-
tolled a "tax savings opportunity" for prospective purchasers of a cor-
poration holding a "1943 tax loss deduction of $120,000" (equal to an
approximately $1.5 million deduction today) and "[s]ole assets [of]
$80,000 in cash and equivalent.' ' 20 9 These advertisements represented
only the most brazen efforts to wed one corporation's unused NOL
carryovers to another's taxable income.210 By the mid-1950's, tax
practitioners recognized that NOL carryovers could "be just as impor-
tant an asset as a trade-name, a trade-mark, a profitable executory
contract, or a favorable lease.' 211 In the years bracketing World War
II, practitioners' understanding of NOL carryovers evolved from an
accounting device, designed to average income over a statutory pe-
riod, to a valuable intangible. This case study describes the economic
and legal developments between 1939 and 1954 that encouraged this
"new source of trade in American financial circles. '212 This market in
loss corporations both shows what Congress sought to curtail in 1954
and illustrates practitioners' interpretations of what was and was not
permissible going into the 1954 reform.
208 See Campisano & Romano, note 206, at 733-34 (arguing that "recoupment" of oper-
ating losses encourages efficient capital investment); Nussim & Tabbach, note 207, at 1526
(arguing that "[e]ven though carrying losses back allows the immediate cashing of tax ben-
efits, it affects taxpayer incentives in a fundamentally different manner than straightfor-
ward refundability").
209 Ad, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1943 at Sll.
210 See Theodore Berger, Purchase of Loss Companies: Code Section 382(a), 32 Taxes
876, 876 (1954) ("With more candor than might be expected, the offer to sell a 'tax loss' has
often been advertised in the financial journals."); James A. Cuddihy, Tax, Legal and Practi-
cal Considerations in Acquisition of a Loss Corporation, 1958 S. Cal. Tax Inst. 303, 303 ("It
is no great secret that for many years, particularly in the post World War II period, loss
corporations were quite freely bought and sold."); Harry J. Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid
Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal Revenue Code, 58 Harv. L. Rev.
196 (1944) (similar).
211 Norman Harris, Acquisition of Loss Corporations Under the New Revenue Code, 60
Com. L.J. 72, 74 (1955); see Berger, note 210, at 878 (describing a view of NOL carryovers,
"to the extent [they are] marketable, [as] asset[s] of the corporation, not essentially differ-
ent from a favorable lease").
212 Harris, note 211, at 72.
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Between 1939 and 1954, Congress expanded the period to which
NOL carryovers could be applied from three years to eight years.
213
As the duration of NOL carryforwards increased, so did their attrac-
tiveness to prospective purchasers, which had more time to earn in-
come that could absorb the stored loss. The 1940's also saw dramatic
increases in corporate tax rates, which rose from 19% to 40% during
World War II, with a supplemental excess profits tax that pushed some
corporations' marginal rates as high as 95%.214 After 1945, inflation
ebbed and Congress allowed the excess profits tax to expire, but the
Revenue Act of 1951 raised normal corporate rates to 52%.215 Rising
corporate rates made NOL carryovers more desirable, since their
value is directly proportional to the taxpayer's marginal rate. Based
on the statutory top marginal corporate tax rate of 52% between 1951
and 1963, one dollar of usable NOL carryovers produced a nominal
economic benefit of fifty-two cents. Purchasers of loss corporations,
however, generally paid between ten and twenty-five cents per dollar
of NOL carryovers, which reflected discounting for the probability of
use within the statutory carryover period, the legal risk of disallow-
ance or changes in law, and buyers' market power.216 Although eco-
nomic conditions encouraged the marketing of NOL carryovers,
practitioners remained wary of transactions that transferred these
types of tax assets. The practitioner community eventually coalesced,
213 See Mark H. Left, The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and Taxation,
1933-1939, at 273-74 (1984); John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal
Income Tax 84-86 (1985). Mark Wilson argues that NOL and excess profits tax carrybacks
provided an implicit subsidy to business in the years after 1945. See Mark R. Wilson, The
Advantages of Obscurity: World War II Tax Carryback Provisions and the Normalization
of Corporate Welfare, in What's Good for Business: Business and American Politics Since
World War II, at 16, 17-19 (Kim Phillips-Fein & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2012).
214 See Witte, note 213, at 138-41; IRS, Corporation Income Tax Brackets and Rates,
1909-2002, at 287-88, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02corate.pdf. The excess
profits tax not only fueled a market in loss corporations, but also encouraged the purchase
and sale of corporate shells with histories of high earnings. These high earnings served as
the baseline against which the excess profits tax was measured. See Boris I. Bittker &
James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 14.41[1]
(7th ed. 2006).
215 Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 121, 65 Stat. 452, 465-69.
216 Indeed, brokers "actually used formulas to fix the sales price" of loss corporations,
and "shell corporations with no asset other than the loss carry-over were sold at from 20
per cent to 25 per cent of the total amount of the loss available." Cuddihy, note 210, at
320-21 (noting, however, that it is "extremely difficult to give a specific value to a loss
carryover" and "each caryover will probably uniquely differ from the last"); Advisory
Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 86th Cong. 840 (1959) [hereinafter 1959
Hearings] (statement of Bernard Wolfman) (pricing NOL carryovers at 10% to 20% of
face amount); id. at 889 (statement of George E. Lent) (stating that NOL carryovers cost
"no more than 10 to 15 cents on each dollar of loss"); Berger, note 210, at 876 n.1 (citing a
1952 estimate that NOL carryovers traded at roughly 25% of the tax savings they could
bring).
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however, around a view, based on interpretations of legal authority,
that permitted these types of transactions.
For practitioners, the critical legal authority that unlocked the trans-
fer NOL carryovers came from the judicial branch, principally in Al-
prosa Watch Corp. v. Commissioner,217 which the Tax Court decided
in 1948. In Alprosa Watch, two individuals purchased a loss corpora-
tion that manufactured gloves. After the purchase, the loss corpora-
tion sold its glove-making equipment, changed its name, relocated,
and reopened as a jewelry retailer.21  The Tax Court held that, be-
cause the corporation's legal identity remained the same (and there
was a nontax business purpose for the transaction), tax credit carry-
overs from the glove business could reduce taxes due on income from
the jewelry business.219 Underlying Alprosa Watch was an entity-ori-
ented formalism, and the decision ushered in a new consensus among
practitioners that moved the line between permissible tax planning
and impermissible tax evasion. This consensus depended less on the
outcome in Alprosa Watch than on practitioners' perception that he
decision validated a specific perspective on what was or was not per-
missible under tax law. As one commentator noted, "[t]he traffic [in
NOL carryovers] started in earnest" after Alprosa Watch.220 These
new legal interpretations, coupled with the growing economic value of
217 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
218 Id. at 242-43. Alprosa Watch gives some flavor of how these types of transactions
were brokered. Before the acquisition, both the glove-making business and the unincorpo-
rated jewelry retailer were headquartered in the same building. The owner of the glove-
making business had recently died, and the owner's estate undertook the sale as part of its
winding-down of affairs. See id. at 242. The price of the glove-making business' NOL
carryforwards was effectively zero: The price received for the glove-making business was
the book value of its assets, which were resold immediately after the acquisition, again at
book value. See Berger, note 210, at 876 n.3.
219 Alprosa Watch, 11. T.C. at 244-46. The court held that § 129, discussed below, did
not apply because tax avoidance was not the principal purpose of the transaction. See
Ralph S. Rice, Internal Revenue Code, Section 269: Does the Left Hand Know What the
Right Is Doing?, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579, 582-83 (1955) (describing the taxpayer-favorable
"principal purpose" cases); Thomas N. Tarleau, Acquisition of Loss Companies, 31 Taxes
1050, 1059 (1953) (finding a business purpose to be "all important" for avoiding § 129). In
dicta, Alprosa Watch also implied that § 129 did not apply to the purchase of a loss corpo-
ration in order to conduct a profitable business through that corporate shell. See Alprosa
Watch, 11. T.C. at 246 (expressing "considerable doubt" that § 129 would have applied, had
the provision been effective for the taxable years at issue). But see British Motor Car
Distrib. v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 392, 394-95 (9th Cir. 1960) (resolving this issue under
§ 129 in the government's favor).
220 See Berger, note 210, at 876. Similarly, with respect to § 129, Alprosa Watch caused
one practitioner to observe that "there exists in the business community an understanding
that acquisitions of the kind covered by Section 129 are now 'all right."' Tarleau, note 219,
at 1050; David Susser, The Tax Consequences of the Net Operating Loss Deduction, 5 Tax
L. Rev. 211, 222 (1949-1950) ("The effect of section 129 on net operating losses seems to
be very limited."). With respect to § 129, the evolving practitioner consensus led to plan-
ning drift.
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NOL carryovers, enabled the market in loss corporations that Con-
gress addressed in 1954.
B. Legislative Reform and Loss Corporations
Congress made two efforts to curtail the market in NOL carryovers
in the 1940's and 1950's, both of which proved largely unsuccessful. In
1943, Congress enacted § 129, an anti-avoidance rule that disallowed
deductions, credits, and other tax benefits that inured to a person be-
cause that person acquired "control" of a corporation with "the prin-
cipal purpose [of] evasion or avoidance of federal income or excess
profits tax. '221 Although Congress intended § 129 to codify pre-ex-
isting judicial doctrines with respect to the purchase and sale of tax
attributes, the provision proved ineffectual after courts read the provi-
sion narrowly and practitioners developed techniques-accepted
,within the tax policy community-to establish a sustainable nontax
business purpose for transactions involving the transfer of NOL carry-
overs.222 Drawing on favorable judicial authorities, practitioners de-
veloped community interpretations that maintained the market in
NOL carryovers in the face of § 129. In this way, practitioners vitiated
the congressional policy underlying § 129, resulting in planning drift.
The failure of § 129 shaped Congress' later legislative efforts to
limit trafficking in loss corporations. In 1954, Congress enacted § 381
and § 382, which represented more robust and concrete attempts to
address the transfer of NOL carryovers and other tax attributes. Stan-
dard-based § 129 remained in the Code as § 269 but played a secon-
dary role to the new rules.223 While § 381 generally liberalized the
treatment of NOL carryovers, § 382 restricted the survival of those tax
attributes following changes in a corporation's equity ownership. Sec-
tion 381 resolved an ongoing debate in the tax policy community
about whether a successor corporation acquired a predecessor corpo-
ration's tax attributes, when, for example, the predecessor merged
into the successor and ceased to exist.224 By contrast, § 382 repudi-
ated the entity-based formalism expressed in Alprosa Watch by deny-
ing the use of NOL carryovers after certain changes in equity
ownership. Section 382 comprised two distinct rules, neither of which
permitted taxpayers to transfer NOL carryovers freely, and both of
221 IRC § 129(a) (1943).
222 See H.R. Rep. No. 78-871, at 49 (1943), reprinted in 1944 C.B. 901; Alprosa Watch,
11 T.C. at 245.
223 The 1954 recodification strengthened § 129 by adding a presumption that the princi-
pal purpose requirement was satisfied for purchases involving a "substantially dispropor-
tionate" price. See IRC § 269(c) (1954). Treasury generally did not enforce § 269(c) and it
was regarded as ineffectual until its repeal in 1976.
224 See H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at 41 (1954).
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which broadened the corporate tax base by limiting § 381 and the for-
malistic, entity-based rule in Alprosa Watch.
Added to the 1954 recodification by the Senate, § 382(a) addressed
"those areas in which abuse has most often arisen"-namely, the cash
purchase of loss corporations in order to absorb income from unre-
lated businesses.22 5 Section 382(a) precluded a corporation from us-
ing its own NOL carryovers if certain shareholders increased their
ownership of the corporation by fifty or more percentage points in a
span of two taxable years.226 Only acquisitions by the corporation's
ten largest shareholders counted towards the threshold, and the stat-
ute required that these acquisitions result from taxable purchases or
taxable redemptions of other shareholders.227 Finally, § 382(a) did
not eliminate a corporation's NOL carryovers if the corporation "con-
tinued to carry on a trade or business substantially the same as that
conducted before any change in the percentage ownership.'228 Only
if the corporation ceased its historic business-as in Alprosa Watch-
did § 382(a) apply to limit NOL carryovers. In effect, § 382(a) re-
versed the consensus among practitioners that corporate shells could
be used to transfer NOL carryovers for tax purposes. Instead, if a
change in corporate ownership occurred, NOL carryovers became
linked to the corporation's business activities.
By contrast, the House included § 382(b) to prevent NOL carry-
overs from being "exploited by persons other than those who incurred
the loss," without regard to any business activities.229 Section 382(b)
addressed tax-free, rather than taxable, transactions. In tax-free
transactions to which § 381 applied, § 382(b) limited an acquiring cor-
poration's use of the target's NOL carryovers, if the target's share-
holders held less than 20% of the acquiring corporation's stock
immediately after the transaction.230 Instead of completely eliminat-
ing the target's NOL carryovers, § 382(b) reduced the carryovers pro-
portionately based on the target shareholders' post-transaction
ownership.231 For each percentage point decrease in target share-
holder ownership below twenty, § 382(b) disallowed 5% of the tar-
225 S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 53 (1954).
226 IRC § 382(a)(1)(A) (1954).
227 IRC § 382 (a)(1)(B), (2); Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 83rd Cong., Summary of
the New Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 1954, at 56 (Comm. Print 1955) [herein-
after 1954 Bluebook].
228 IRC § 382(a)(1)(C).
229 H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, note 224, at 42.
230 IRC § 382(b)(1) (1959).
231 IRC § 382(b)(2).
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get's NOL carryovers.232 For purposes of § 382(b), the business
activities of the acquiring corporation and target were irrelevant.
2 33
Although Chairman Daniel Reed of the House Ways and Means
Committee listed § 382 as one of more than fifty loophole-closing pro-
visions in the 1954 recodification, practitioners argued that § 382
presented no real bar to tax avoidance and instead opened a wealth of
planning opportunities.2 34 Indeed, private practitioners almost imme-
diately implemented these planning techniques to maintain the mar-
ket in NOL carryovers. Public knowledge about potential loopholes
in § 382 raises questions about the provision's true political purpose.
As a nonincremental change to policy that ostensibly improved gen-
eral welfare, the provision may represent a genuine (but ineffective)
effort at reform legislation.2 35 Alternatively, § 382 could be viewed as
a public choice story, in which private interests acquired § 381, which
facilitated the transfer of NOL carryovers, only at the cost of § 382,
which restricted some of those transfers. Because there is little evi-
dence of explicit lobbying on these provisions, this interpretation has
less explanatory power.236 Finally, § 382 may be symbolic legislation
or legislation enacted as political grandstanding to enhance the power
and prestige of Congress or the President.237 At the very least,
lawmakers should have known that § 382 was susceptible to planning
and avoidance, and, for this reason, § 382 may have functioned in part
to enhance at least some lawmakers' prestige without imposing the
legislation's full costs on its ostensible targets. These three explana-
tions are not mutually exclusive, and they permit a range of interpre-
tations about whether, from the perspective of Congress and the
President in 1954, the planning drift that followed the enactment of
§ 382 was wanted or unwanted. At least publicly, however, members
232 1954 Blue Book, note 227, at 56-57.
233 The rule-bound House language was analogous to the American Law Institute's 1954
legislative proposal to limit NOL carryovers. See 2 ALI, Federal Income Statute 51, 303
(Feb. 1954 Draft) [hereinafter ALI 1954 Draft] (treating a sale of 80% of a corporation's
stock within a twelve-month period as a reincorporation in which all NOL carryovers are
"wiped out").
234 See 100 Cong. Rec. 3427 (1954) (statement of Rep. Daniel A. Reed) (listing as a
loophole "the trafficking in net operating loss carry-overs"); Hearing on H.R. 8300 Before
S. Comm. on Fin., 83d Cong. 409 (1954) (statement of Am. Bar Assn) (arguing that the
new law "creates a loophole by which any well-advised person may avoid section 382"); see
also Witte, note 213, at 146.
235 See Patashnik, note 202, at 16-18 (defining a general-interest reform as a "conscious,
non-incremental shift in a pre-existing line of policymaking intended to produce general
benefits").
236 See Shaviro, note 135 (noting this common critique).
237 See id. at 8-9.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
2016]
of Congress decried trafficking in loss corporations and advocated for
§ 382 as a substantive limitation on this practice.238
C. Understanding the Corporate Tax Base
Provisions that police the transfer of NOL carryovers, such as § 382,
define the type of corporate changes that preclude NOL carryovers'
survival or usability. At stake in these provisions-and more gener-
ally in the debate about the transfer of NOL carryovers-is the design
of the corporate tax base. If corporations can trade NOL carryovers
without limitation, then the tax base comprises all business activities
conducted in corporate form, net of aggregate losses.239 Excluding
transaction costs, freely transferable NOL carryovers create the same
tax base as a system in which annual losses are fully refundable.240 To
the extent that pre-change NOL carryovers are disallowed, the corpo-
rate tax base grows. Business- or sector-specific limitations segment
the tax base by netting only certain categories of income and loss.241
For this reason, § 382 and similar limitations can be described as base
broadening, at least on their face, and the debate over § 382 at its core
is about the scope and meaning of corporate taxation.242
Commentators described the disjunctions between § 382(a) and
§ 382(b) as "technical defects" and "conflicting and uncoordi-
nated.' '243 In part, the provisions reflect political exigencies and the
short timeframe in which Congress enacted the 1954 recodification.
More fundamentally, the disparate provisions exhibit distinct concep-
tions of the corporate tax base. Section 382(a) segmented corpora-
tions' activities by business, generating a corporate tax base that
netted gains and losses on a sector-by-sector or investment-by-invest-
ment basis.244 Contemporary commentators critiqued this approach
as unprincipled, since it effectively divided taxpayers based on their
238 See Reed Statement, note 234.
239 See Campisano & Romano, note 206, at 740-42.
240 If the preferred tax base is all corporate activities, then transaction costs result in a
deviation from the ideal base. Such a deviation could be justified if measures such as full
loss refundability are infeasible. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
Econ. 1 (1960); see also Nussim & Tabbach, note 207, at 1520-25 (discussing the equiva-
lence of loss offset, loss refund, and loss transfer systems).
241 See George K. Yin, Of Diamonds and Coal: A Retrospective Examination of the
Loss Carryover Controversy, 48 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 41-1, 41-21 to 41-23 (1990).
242 See, e.g., Johnson, note 204, at 1077 (describing § 382 reform as a way for Congress
to "do some good and defend the tax base as it raises revenue"). 1
243 See Yin, note 241, at 41-7 to 41-8; Advisory Group on Subchapter C, Revised Report
on Corporate Distributions and Adjustments 89 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 Advisory Group
Report] (discussed in Section III.E).
244 Section 382(a) was analogous to the ALI 1954 legislative proposal to limit NOL car-
ryovers. See ALI 1954 Draft, note 233.
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business activities.245 By contrast, § 382(b) presented atax base that
netted activities with respect to shareholders.246 A third understand-
ing of the corporate tax base-one that supported free transferabil-
ity-was apparent in § 269(c), also enacted in 1954. Section 269(c)
provided a presumption of a tax avoidance purpose if the price paid
for a corporation did not reflect the value of the corporation's tax
attributions, including NOL carryovers.247 As Treasury officials
noted, § 269(c) implied "a philosophy that all one needs to do to be in
the clear is to pay for the loss"-that is, that NOL carryovers could be
freely transferrable.248 Some private practitioners also advocated for
the unfettered transferability of NOL carryovers.249 Although
§ 382(a), § 382(b), and § 269(c) did not function cohesively (and tax-
payers took advantage of arbitrage opportunities), the provisions illus-
trate more than the vagaries of the legislative process-they show
genuine uncertainty about the proper scope of the corporate tax base.
Other legal authorities demonstrated additional interpretations of the
corporate tax base. In 1957, the Supreme Court decided Libson
Shops, Inc. v. Koehler,2 0 which, in effect, proposed a fourth concep-
tion of the appropriate corporate tax base that tied NOL carryovers to
the specific, historic business that generated them. Labor groups, such
as the AFL-CIO, and other commentators advocated this type of un-
derstanding of the corporate tax base.251 These competing interpreta-
tions-and government's inability to settle on a unified theory of
transferability for NOL carryovers-illustrates the type of unsettled
policy principles conducive to planning drift.
245 See 1959 Hearings, note 216, at 889 (statement of George Lent) (arguing that it was
incoherent for Congress to "condone[ ] a practice within an industry that it condemn[ed]
when undertaken across industry lines").
246 H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, note 224, at A143.
247 IRC § 269(c) (before repeal in 1976).
248 Preliminary Draft of Report on Corporate Distributions and Adjustments to Accom-
pany Advisory Group, Confidential Print No. 1, Subcomm. on Internal Revenue Taxation
of the H. Comm. of Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 74 (1957) (language removed in final
report per Surrey's Comments), in Stanley S. Surrey Papers, Harvard Law School Library
[hereinafter Surrey Papers], box 23, folder 20-1.
249 See Thomas N. Tarleau, Difficulties Faced by Taxpayer Trying to Take Tax Advan-
tage of Loss Carryover, 4 J. Tax'n 91, 94-95 (1956) ("I would propose that we consider a
revision of the Code which eliminates interference with the free trade in tax loss carry-
overs."); see also 1959 Hearings, note 216, at 888 (statement of George Lent) ("[I]f it were
the purpose of the Government to reimburse a corporation for losses upon its winding up,
this should be done directly and not through the juggling of such losses in the
marketplace.").
250 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
251 See 1959 Hearings, note 216, at 878 (statement of Stanley H. Ruttenberg) (advocat-
ing "attaching [NOL carryovers] firmly to the actual business operation that produced
[them]").
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D. Tax Planning and § 382
In 1958, James Cuddihy, a well-known tax practitioner who worked
with companies in the market for NOL carryovers, described a consul-
tation with "the presidents of two large corporations with substantial
continental and intercontinental holdings." 252 According to Cuddihy:
The corporations had discussed merger and it seemed the
most perfect of business combinations .... After a full expla-
nation of the problem involved, the writer discovered that
the real difficulty was that both presidents had a sense that it
was not quite proper to merge or consolidate since one of the
corporations had a substantial oss. They were fearful of ad-
verse public relations if the merger was completed.
.... It was therefore pointed out to them [by Cuddihy] that
the deductions were allowed by law and were privilege
granted by Congress... [I]f Congress and the courts see fit to
sanction the use of carryovers, and in many instances they
do, there should be no question of morality involved, but
rather one of mechanics to comply with the law.
253
In the 1950's, the creative development of these "mechanics" by tax
practitioners drove planning drift with respect to § 382. Although tax
practitioners felt that in § 382 "Congress for the first time clearly de-
clare[d] the policy that a tax benefit should not be an article of com-
merce," this conviction about congressional intent did not prevent
practitioners from designing structures that transferred NOL carry-
overs without triggering § 382.254 Indeed, less than a week after Presi-
dent Eisenhower signed the 1954 Code into law, an attorney from
Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley "emphasized that business men
should check carefully with tax advisers if they are relying on a loss
carry-over.' 255 Although § 382 generally limited the purchase and
sale of shell corporations containing only NOL carryovers, commenta-
tors argued that, once "corporate tax experts [ ] had a good chance to
analyze the revised rules," they were "ready to go ahead again with
252 Cuddihy, note 210, at 307.
253 Id. at 307. Management anxiety about the public relations effects of trafficking in
loss corporations mirrors similar concerns about corporate inversions since the late 1990's.
See Hicks, note 43; Andrew Velarde, Walgreens Won't Invert Following Alliance Boots
Acquisition, 144 Tax Notes 662 (Aug. 11, 2014) (describing public and political pressure in
advance of Walgreens' announcement hat it would not pursue an inversion transaction).
254 Berger, note 210, at 878.
255 Study Still Given U.S. Tax Problem, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1954 at 22.
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mergers involving tax-loss situation.'2 56 By 1959, the market in NOL
carryovers had returned or even exceeded pre-1954 levels of activ-
ity.257 This resurgence spurred action by Congress and Treasury, and
the content and relative ineffectiveness of these responses show how
private interpretations of § 382 led to planning drift.
In the 1950's tax practitioners developed three general categories of
techniques by which a profitable corporation could acquire a loss cor-
poration's NOL carryovers.258 Some techniques focused on generat-
ing the factual predicate needed to fall outside of § 382(a)'s standard-
driven continuity-of-business requirement. Alternatively, tax practi-
tioners devised complex acquisition structures that adroitly avoided
the rule-bound strictures of § 382(a) and (b). Finally, a few practition-
ers envisioned an affirmative use for § 382(b) as a means to inoculate
transactions from the application of standard-based § 269. When se-
lecting from multiple planning techniques that exploited both the rule-
bound and standard-based aspects of the provisions governing NOL
carryovers, tax practitioners weighed legal certainty against business
needs, manufacturing favorable facts and reconfiguring deals to create
the desired tax outcome. These planning techniques reflected a gen-
eral view that precluded trading in corporate shells with NOL carry-
overs but permitted more complex techniques involving nuanced and
often technical constructions of § 382. Transactional structures prolif-
erated as practitioners designed, discussed, and deployed various tax
avoidance plans, while Treasury and the courts struggled to deter un-
desirable practices. Although practitioners were not unified in how
they viewed § 382, they generally treated these sophisticated tech-
niques for transferring NOL carryovers as legally reasonable.
In a taxable stock purchase that met the ownership requirements of
§ 382(a), a loss corporation's NOL carryovers remained available if
the corporation continued "substantially the same" business as before
the acquisition.2 59 In effect, practitioners had complete transactional
freedom, as long as the loss corporation satisfied the continuity of bus-
256 Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 85th Cong. 3102 (1958) (statement of Solomon
Barkin) (citing Business Week).
257 1959 Hearings, note 216, at 880 (memorandum of Solomon Barkin) (arguing that
there were "just as many profitable companies seeking loss situations today as there were
before 1954-probably more") (quoting Robert S. Holzman).
258 In addition, practitioners developed multiple strategies through which loss corpora-
tions could acquire potentially profitable businesses. Essentially, these techniques re-
versed the direction of the type of transactions targeted by § 382. And legal experts agreed
that § 382 did not apply to these transactions. See, e.g., 1959 Hearings, note 216, at 887
(statement of George E. Lent) ("The code imposes no prohibition or limitation on the
carryover of losses against the profits of the other business."); Cuddihy, note 210, at 326
(similar).
259 IRC § 382(a)(1)(C) (1954).
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iness requirement. Before Treasury issued regulations under § 382 in
1962, legislative history provided the sole guidance for practitioners
making this fact-intensive determination. In 1954, the Senate Finance
Committee stated that a change in business included situations in
which "the [loss] corporation shifts from one type of business to an-
other, discontinues any except a minor portion of its business, [or]
changes its location. '260 Practitioners, however, were left to explore
and develop the precise meaning of these facially restrictive factors
through their own private interpretations.
After the 1954 recodification, tax practitioners speculated on the
minimum facts needed to satisfy § 382(a)'s business continuity re-
quirement.261 These practitioners generally agreed that corporate
shells containing only NOL carryovers and liquid, nonbusiness assets
could not meet the requirement, since such corporations had no busi-
ness activities. It was insufficient merely to continue "whatever there
was" in the distressed corporation; instead, an affirmative business
had to exist.2 62 But practitioners also dismissed as absurd a strict in-
terpretation of the Finance Committee's language precluding changes
in "location," reasoning that it was "highly unlikely that the statute
[would] be given such a narrow construction in final regulations or
court decisions.2 63 From this perspective, the norms of the tax policy
community militated against a strict interpretation of the Finance
Committee's words.264 These types of private interpretations initiated
the process of giving content to § 382(a)'s business continuity require-
260 S. Rep. No. 83-1622, note 225, at 285.
261 Indeed, after 1954, advertisements for loss corporations began to specify a line of
business. See, e.g., Ad, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1960, at 24F; Ad, Barron's Nat'l Bus. & Fin.
Weekly, Feb. 13, 1956, at 62.
262 Albert E. Arent, Tax Aspects of Buying Loss Corporations Under the 1954 Code, 33
Taxes 955, 957 (1955); see also Samuel J. Lanahan, Untitled Document 6-7 (Dec. 17, 1957),
in Edwin S. Cohen Papers, Arthur J. Morris Law Library, University of Virginia School of
Law, Special Collections [hereinafter Cohen Papers], box 116 (arguing that such corpora-
tions were really "shell[s] in a business sense"); Rev. Rul. 58-9, 1958-1 C.B. 190 (denying
the use of NOL carryovers after the acquisition of an inactive loss corporation).
263 Arent, note 262, at 957; see Goodwyn Crockery Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 355
(1961), aff'd, 315 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963) (finding, with two dissents, that the taxpayer's
business remained the same for § 382(a), notwithstanding a change of location, the addi-
tion of a retail business, and changes in clients).
264 See Untitled Document (Feb. 20, 1957), in Cohen Papers, note 262, box 116 (noting,
in comments from Treasury, that the business continuity test "leaves much to be desired in
the way of an objective test administratively" and requesting that the Subchapter C advi-
sory group provide "some examples of what a wise administration of the provision would
be"). Taxpayers may have interpreted § 382(a)'s continuity of business requirement by
reference to the more permissive standard required by courts for certain tax-free reorgani-
zations. See Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932) (A.
Hand, J.)
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ment and set baseline understandings and expectations against which
Treasury later gauged its response.
Other practitioners located planning opportunities within the Fi-
nance Committee's prohibition against discontinuing "any except of a
minor portion of its business.'265 Practitioners argued that, if a loss
corporation sold nearly all of its business assets before, but not in con-
nection with, a taxable stock purchase, then the acquiring corporation
could continue what remained of the loss corporation's business and
use any NOL carryovers.266 For this reason, practitioners sometimes
advised loss corporations to wind down all but a small portion of their
business activities before seeking a buyer interested in NOL carry-
overs.2 67 Alternatively, some practitioners argued that, if a loss corpo-
ration operated multiple trades or businesses, then the acquiring
corporation could "abandon[ ] one business after acquisition" and still
preserve the loss corporation's NOL carryovers.2 68 Practitioners de-
veloped theories for tailoring taxpayers' facts to meet the standards of
§ 382(a)'s business continuity exception and forestall any elimination
of NOL carryovers. These interpretations gave substance to the busi-
ness activity standard in § 382(a) and provided the building blocks for
planning drift.
In addition to fact-based techniques that filled in the gaps in
§ 382(a), practitioners developed technical strategies that avoided
§ 382 through creative use of stock instruments and complex multi-
step transactions. Because the ownership test under § 382(a) ignored
nonvoting preferred stock, new investors could contribute cash to a
loss corporation in exchange for preferred stock, the dividends from
which tracked the economic returns from a new, and hopefully profit-
able, business. If the loss corporation's old owners retained at least
50% of the voting common stock, § 382(a) did not apply. Further-
more, these old owners' control rights could be limited by a variety of
legal arrangements. Once the new business absorbed the loss corpo-
ration's NOL carryovers, the corporation could be dissolved.269
In staged multi-step transactions, an acquiring corporation might
acquire the target's stock in a series of taxable purchases that ex-
265 S. Rep. No. 83-1622, note 225, at 285.
266 See John G. Gemmill, Loss Corporations, 36 Taxes 105, 106 (1958).
267 See Samuel J. Lanahan, Untitled Document, in Cohen Papers, note 262, box 116, at
6-7 (contending that § 269 should supplement § 382 in such situations).
268 See Cuddihy, note 210, at 331.
269 See, e.g., Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965).
Congress attempted to end this strategy in 1986 by restricting the definition of "preferred
stock" and granting Treasury the ability, through regulations, to treat certain stock inter-
ests as "not stock." See § 382(k)(6)(B)(ii); see also Peter L. Faber & Mark J. Silverman,
An Analysis of the New Ownership Regs Under Section 382: Part I, 68 J. Tax'n 68 (1988)
(arguing that Treasury's regulations did not apply to Maxwell Hardware fact patterns).
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ceeded the statutory two-year time period to which § 382(a) applied.
An initial purchase of less than 50% of the target's stock might yield
working control, and a subsequent purchase outside the two-year win-
dow could bring the acquiring corporation's ownership above 80%.
At this point, the target could be liquidated tax-free into the acquiring
corporation, which succeeded to the target's NOL carryovers under
§ 381(a).2 70  Because the five-year NOL carryforward period ex-
ceeded § 382(a)'s two-year testing period, the acquiring corporation
could use the target's pre-acquisition NOL carryovers at the cost of
deferring some of their tax benefit. If the acquisitions were pursuant
to a single plan, however, the transaction risked recharacterization
under judicially created principles, including the step transaction
doctrine.
271
Multi-step techniques also enabled taxpayers to avoid § 382(b)'s
20% continuity of ownership requirement. These techniques de-
pended on the quirk that neither § 382(a) nor § 382(b) applied to tax-
free stock-for-stock exchanges (B reorganizations) or tax-free contri-
butions of property to a corporation (§ 351 transactions).2 72 If a gain
corporation acquired at least 80% of a loss corporation's stock in a B
reorganization, the loss corporation could be liquidated into the gain
corporation without triggering § 382(b).273 In order to avoid
recharacterization as an acquisition of assets, tax practitioners recom-
mended leaving a one- or two-year gap between the acquisition and
the liquidation.2 74 Alternatively, the acquiring corporation could fol-
low the B reorganization with a § 351 contribution of income-produc-
ing assets to the loss corporation. Again, each step in this structure
fell outside of § 382(b)'s rule-bound language.275 Common to these
complex transactional structures was a narrow reading of congres-
270 See Richard H. Levin, Purchase and Sale of Corporate Businesses: Tax Opportuni-
ties and Pitfalls, 35 Taxes 942, 944-45 (1957) (noting that "this procedure creates a drive
toward under-the-table agreements"); Lanahan, Untitled Document, in Cohen Papers,
note 262, box 116, at 6-7 (detailing a variation on the acquire/then liquidate structure).
271 See also Jackson Oldsmobile, Inc. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1964)
(staged buy-out upheld); Glover Packing Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 342 (Ct. Cl. 1964)
(staged buy-out involving a voting trust not upheld). Although the IRS (unsuccessfully)
challenged these types of transactions under a Libson Shops rationale, it did not respond
to these techniques in regulations or informal rulemaking, perhaps because the transac-
tions hewed to the statute's literal language.
272 See IRC § 382(a), (b)(1) (1954) (applying only to taxable purchases and transactions
described in § 381(a)).
273 See IRC § 332 (governing tax-free liquidations).
274 See Cuddihy, note 210, at 328; Arent, note 262, at 958-59; Untitled Document (Feb.
20, 1957), in Cohen Papers, box 116, note 262. These transactions predated formal admin-
istrative guidance that recharacterized a B reorganization followed by a tax-free liquida-
tion as a tax-free acquisition of assets. See Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141.
275 Arent, note 262, at 959. The 1976 reforms to § 382 would have applied to § 351
transactions and B reorganizations. These reforms, although passed by Congress, did not
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sional intent by tax practitioners, who meticulously assembled com-
plex transactions to steer around the rule-bound hurdles created by
§ 382 while generally ignoring more general proscriptions about the
buying and selling of NOL carryforwards.
Finally, some practitioners envisioned an affirmative use for
§ 382(b): to inoculate transactions against the uncertain scope of
§ 269, the standard-based disallowance rule for NOL carryovers, by
forgoing a nominal portion of the loss corporation's NOL carryovers.
Although § 269's predecessor gained little traction among taxpayers
or courts before 1954, the provision acquired new life after the 1954
recodification.2 76 As a result, tax practitioners began to consider the
interaction of § 269 and § 382. These practitioners noted the Senate
Finance Committee's 1954 assertion that, "[i]f a limitation in this sec-
tion [382] applies to a net operating loss carryover, section 269 ...
shall not also be applied to such net operating loss carryover.
2 77
Practitioners hypothesized a structure in which a loss corporation's
shareholders received 19% of the acquiring corporation's stock in a
transaction to which § 382(b) applied. Although § 382(b) would disal-
low 5% of the loss corporation's NOL carryovers, the acquiring cor-
poration would not face the uncertainties surrounding standard-based
§ 269.278 This structure traded full use of the loss corporation's NOL
carryovers for a more definite outcome under § 269. Of course, the
Senate introduced only § 382(a), making it somewhat implausible that
the Senate's statement should apply to the House's half of the provi-
sion, § 382(b).279 Some taxpayers, however, implemented the strategy
outlined above. When faced with such a structure on audit, Treasury
settled with the taxpayer, noting that the case was "probably a bad
case to litigate. s280 Although this structure probably represented a
minority view within the practitioner policy community, the affirma-
tive use of § 382 shows how private planning techniques resulted in
take effect and were superseded by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §806, 90 Stat. 1520, 1599-1600.
276 See William M. Speiller, Acquisitions by Loss Corporations of Profitable Businesses,
40 Taxes 22, 33 (1962) (discussing case law under § 269); see also Schler, note 38, at 372-73
("The Service historically has brought very few cases under § 269.... As a result, taxpayers
and tax advisers tend to give very little weight to the possibility that the Service will attack
a tax shelter based on § 269.").
277 See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, note 225, at 284 (adding that "the fact that a limitation
under this section does not apply shall have no effect upon whether section 269 applies").
278 See Cuddihy, note 210, at 337.
279 In subsequent regulations, Treasury took the position that the application of § 382(b)
did not preclude the application of § 269. See Reg. § 1.269-6 (Ex.1) (1962). In this way,
practitioners' conversations about legal issues directly set the agenda for Treasury's subse-
quent rulemaking.
280 See Surrey Papers, note 248, box 137, folder 101-1 (memorandum discussing Inter-
oceanic Commodities Corporation).
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reconstructive interpretations that implicated new understandings of
public policy different from those of the enacting legislature in
1954.281 These reconstructive interpretations resulted in planning
drift, both during the period they went uncorrected and through their
effect on subsequent agency rulemaking.
E. Legislative and Regulatory Responses
In the late 1950's, public debate over the transfer of NOL carry-
overs revived, and both Congress and Treasury engaged in efforts to
curtail trafficking in loss corporations. In 1956, Congressman Wilbur
Mills, a powerful member of Ways and Means who ascended to chair-
man in 1958, convened a special advisory group tasked with drafting
revisions to the 1954 recodification's corporate tax rules.282
The advisory group, whose members came from private practice,
published its findings and recommendations in 1957 and 1958, and
these findings were elaborated at subsequent hearings in 1958 and
1959.283 For § 382, the advisory group's relatively modest proposal
would have harmonized § 382(a) and § 382(b) by limiting NOL carry-
overs after any 50% change in ownership, taxable or tax-free, without
regard to any change in business.28 4 This proposal would have made
§ 382 entirely rule-bound, relegated standard-based analysis to § 269,
and eliminated planning strategies involving business continuity and
some multi-step planning techniques.28 5 Notwithstanding Mills' re-
nowned ability to control tax legislation and shepherd his preferred
proposals to enactment, Congress did not summon the will to correct
private practitioners' interpretations of § 382.286 Although the hear-
ings aired strong critiques of practitioners' efforts to circumvent the
281 See Surrey Papers, note 248, box 137, folder 101-1 (memorandum discussing practi-
tioner interpretations).
282 See Edwin S. Cohen, A Lawyer's Life: Deep in the Heart of Taxes 269 (1994).
283 See 1958 Advisory Group Report, note 243; 1959 Hearings, note 216.
284 See 1958 Advisory Group Report, note 243, at 92; see also Letter from Norris Dar-
rell to Samuel J. Lanahan (Nov. 14, 1957), in Cohen Papers, note 262, box 116 (advocating
that § 382 treat acquisitions the same, regardless of method). The advisory group consid-
ered adopting the principle from Libson Shops, "that loss carryovers can be applied only
against income from the business which generated the loss." This was rejected as being
"too narrow a rule, not in harmony with the general carryover scheme of the statute, and
that it would be difficult to draft and apply." 1958 Advisory Group Report, supra, at 90.
285 The advisory group would have strengthened § 269 to address acquisitions followed
by a discontinuation of the target's historic business. See 1958 Advisory Group Report,
note 243, at 92; see also Letter from Stanley S. Surrey to Edwin S. Cohen (Nov. 27, 1957),
in Cohen Papers, note 262, box 116 ("This approach [of the advisory committee] will put a
strain on Section 269, and I doubt whether it can stand the strain.").
286 At the hearings, Mills heavily critiqued tax planning that avoided § 382. These com-
ments, of course, could have been grandstanding, although t ey are not inconsistent with
Mills' more general approach to tax law. See Zelizer, note 44.
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policy behind § 382 and § 269, these critiques failed to temper practi-
tioners' enthusiasm for planning techniques that transferred NOL car-
ryovers. In the absence of legislative correction, these planning
techniques were authoritative to the extent they remained accepted
within the tax policy community, and the result was planning drift.
In December 1960, Treasury proposed regulations under § 382 that
broadened and clarified the provision's scope, and in 1962 these regu-
lations were finalized in substantially similar form.287 The 1962 regu-
lations addressed several planning techniques developed by
practitioners in the 1950's. Specifically, the 1962 regulations elabo-
rated the continuity of business exception under § 382(a) and pro-
vided several rules under § 382(b) to address multi-step acquisitions
that, by their form, avoided any limitation on NOL carryovers. Con-
strained by the statute's structure and the need to respond to practi-
tioners' planning, Treasury produced regulations that were reactive
rather than conceptual, and private practitioners simply channeled
their creative energy into alternative methods to circumvent § 382.
The 1962 regulations clarified Treasury's position with respect to
planning techniques involving § 382(a)'s continuity of business excep-
tion by essentially adopting the Senate Finance Committee's stringent
language about shifts in type, quantity, and location of business opera-
tions. The 1962 regulations denied continuity of business if a corpora-
tion's business was "substantially altered" because of "changes [in] the
location of a major portion of its activities. '2 88 Furthermore, the 1962
regulations defined a "facts and circumstances" test for business con-
tinuity by looking to whether a corporation's "loss carryovers are used
to offset gains of a business unrelated to that that which produced the
losses.'289 Finally, the 1962 regulations provided that any stock
purchase in § 382(a)'s two-year testing period triggered the business
continuity requirement, which restricted loss corporations' ability to
divest themselves of business assets before a § 382(a) acquisition.
290
Tax practitioners interpreted these "fairly stringent" regulations to
limit standard-oriented planning techniques under § 382(a).
291
In the 1962 regulations, Treasury also addressed multi-step planning
techniques under § 382(b). The regulations expressly recast tax-free
stock acquisitions followed by tax-free liquidations as asset acquisi-
tions.292 In conjunction with a general anti-abuse rule that treated
287 See T.D. 6616, 1962-2 C.B. 98.
288 See Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h)(9) (1962).
289 Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h)(5). This provision reflected a limited version of the Libson
Shops doctrine.
290 See id.
291 See Wootton, note 204, at 875 n.8.
292 Reg. § 1.382(b)-1(a)(6) (1962).
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"two or more successive reorganizations" as occurring "simultane-
ously," this recast either foreclosed or created uncertainty about the
treatment of multi-step planning techniques.293 Other detailed rules
attempted to ensure that target shareholders received a full 20% eq-
uity interest in the acquiring corporation.294 In this way, the 1962 reg-
ulations restricted tax practitioners' flexibility in structuring
acquisitions of loss corporations by essentially responding to existing
interstitial and reconstructive interpretations of § 382.
In addition, Treasury's agenda was set by eight years of tax planning
that preceded its regulations under § 382. This long delay not only
allowed private interpretations to define § 382's implementation
before 1962, but Treasury's final regulations proved narrow and reac-
tive. Counterfactual regulations, promulgated without any prior inter-
pretations by practitioners, could have had different focus or content.
Following this flurry of regulatory activity, one practitioner rumi-
nated that "[f]ew areas of tax law have undergone such rapid change
as the rules governing utilization of operating losses.'295 This rapid
change, however, had little practical consequence. Because of tax
practitioners' planning efforts, the actual practice of transferring NOL
carryovers continued almost unhindered after Congress enacted § 382
in 1954-and, indeed, after Treasury finalized the 1962 regulations.
Congress proved unable to enact legislation that would strengthen or
clarify § 382, and Treasury was reduced to reacting to existing plan-
ning techniques. Private planning involving § 382 shifted the line be-
tween permissible and impermissible transfers of NOL carryovers in
taxpayers' favor, and this advantage persisted even after opportunities
for legislative and administrative correction. In this way, planning
drift affected policy development with respect to NOL carryovers, and
the market in NOL carryovers continued until the Tax Reform Act of
1986 completely rewrote § 382 and the rules governing loss corpora-
tions. Although aspects of the 1986 reform296 reflected prior planning
practices, the new § 382 substantially changed the planning landscape,
as new techniques arose to avoid the new provision and the market in
loss corporations cooled.297
293 Reg. § 1.382(b)-1(c).
294 See Reg. § 1.382(b)-1(a)(2).
295 Deshler D. Armstrong, New Barriers to Utilization of Operating Losses, 40 Taxes
867, 867 (1962).
296 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 621, 100 Stat. 2085, 2254-65.
297 See notes 204, 261. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806, 90 Stat.
1520, 1599-1600, included significant changes to § 382, but the effective date of these revi-
sions was continually delayed until the reforms of 1986 mooted the issue.
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